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Hegel and What is Actual

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What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.¹

When Hegel published this notorious line in the *Philosophy of Right*, his readers instantly suspected him of Prussian apologetics.² Was he saying that nothing could surpass the actual political state in whose employ Hegel was? Readers of the *Science of Logic* knew different. This was only Hegel's way of saying there is no unreachable, transcendental beyond.³ Essence must appear. What is "in itself" (implicit) must become "for itself" (express). "When being posits its entire inwardness [*i.e.*, essence] outside itself, it becomes actual."⁴

Actuality is the state in which the in-itself of Essence finally becomes for itself. Its progress is chronicled in the final three chapters of Essence in the *Science of Logic*. The Actuality chapters constitute the "speculative" truth of Essence. Reflection—"formless essence" (529)⁵—was the immediate moment of Essence. Appearance was dialectic. Actuality constitutes the unity between Reflection and Appearance.⁶

Appearance ended with the unity of Inner and Outer in which "the content of both is only one identical substrate and equally only one identity of form." (529)⁷ This unity is the Absolute as such. Here, in the second shortest chapter of the *Science of Logic*,⁸ "form has sublated itself and made itself into the empty or outer difference of an outer and inner." (529)⁹ This version of the Absolute, however, is "antithetical to difference."¹⁰ Reflection is, so far, external to the Absolute. It "merely contemplates rather than is the absolute's own movement." (529)¹¹ Reflection must discover that it *is* "essentially this movement." (529)¹² When it does, the Absolute will be strong enough to encompass difference.

The second chapter of Actuality is Actuality proper, where Hegel considers the relation of possibility and necessity. These will bring difference into the Absolute.¹³ Actuality terminates with Absolute Relation—or Substance, which is the Notion's "immediate presupposition." (577)¹⁴ Here will

¹ GEORG W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 20 Addition (Allen W. Wood trans. 1993).

² See TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL: A BIOGRAPHY 342 (2000) (describing the contemporary reaction to the *Philosophy of Right*).

³ CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 279 (1975) ("It is external reality which is fully expression of the essence, and external reality which has nothing hidden behind it, because it is full manifestation of what is essential").

⁴ HERBERT MARCUSE, HEGEL'S ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICITY 92 (Seyla Benhabib trans. 1987).

⁵ "[G]estaltlose Wesen." [II:156]; see Michael Kosok, *The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic: Its Formal Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive Foundation*, in HEGEL: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 237, 239 (Alasdair MacIntyre ed., 1972) ("Reflection is thus a shift from a pre-formal to a post-formal situation, wherein a well-formed universe appears as an intermediate stage").

⁶ But see Deborah Chaffin, *The Logic of Contingency*, in HEGEL RECONSIDERED: BEYOND METAPHYSICS AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., & Terry Pinkard eds., 143 (1994)). According to Chaffin:

The two principal regions of essence, appearance and actuality, are determined by the relation these two reflections bear to one another: if the relation between them is one of immediate difference, we have the sphere of appearance; if the relation is one of mediated identity, we have the sphere of actuality.

Id. at 143. In fact, Essence has *three* principal regions; Appearance is the moment that posits difference between Reflection and Appearance. Actuality is the mediated identity of Reflection and Appearance.

⁷ "[D]er Inhalt beider nur Eine identische Grundlage und ebensoviele nur Eine Identität der Form ist." [II:156]

⁸ The chapter on Chemism is shorter. See chapter 23. There is no chapter in the *Lesser Logic* corresponding to the Absolute. But, Marcuse thinks, this just shows that the *Science of Logic* is the superior, more complete exposition of Hegel's philosophy. The *Lesser Logic* is only an outline, and "in this context the presence of a chapter on the absolute would only be confusing and unintelligible." MARCUSE, ONTOLOGY, *supra* note 4, at 90. In Marcuse's opinion, chapter 16 stands for "[t]he comprehensive determination of the motility of actuality . . ." *Id.* at 104. "Motility" is the capacity for movement.

⁹ "[D]ie Form aufgehoben und zu dem leeren oder äußern Unterschiedes eines Äußern und Innern gemacht hat." [II:156]

¹⁰ JOHN F. HOFFMEYER, THE ADVENT OF FREEDOM: THE PRESENCE OF THE FUTURE IN HEGEL'S LOGIC 16 (1994).

¹¹ "[N]ur betrachtet, als daß sie seine eigene Bewegung wäre." [II:156]

¹² "[W]esentlich dies ist." [II:156]

¹³ HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 16.

¹⁴ "[U]nmittelbaren Voraussetzung." [II:214]

be vindicated Hegel's slogan that substance is subject.¹⁵ The third chapter will be the Absolute Relation, in which Cause and Effect sublimate themselves and establish Reciprocal Action. When inner and outer show themselves to be passive, active and the unity of passive and active, the Notion is before us, and the Objective Logic draws to a close.

I. The Absolute

A. The Exposition of the Absolute

This essay is the sixth in a series that documents every progression made in Hegel's *Science of Logic*. By now we are nearing the end of the Objective Logic and beginning of the Subjective Logic; accordingly, the next three chapters bear on psychoanalytic points. It is my thesis that the Exposition of the Absolute corresponds with what Hegel describes as madness in that part of the Encyclopedia now published as *Philosophy of Mind*.¹⁶ If the Absolute is taken as the subject, then the subject now begins to emerge from nature by obliterating it. Having madly obliterated everything, it is prepared to reconstruct a new world out of symbolic or conceptual materials.¹⁷ These symbolic materials are the determinations that subjectivity makes of its own self. But these determinations are never entirely adequate to the subject. The subject is therefore very much a Hegelian "thing"—a unity of diverse properties which the subject could and must shed if it is to manifest its truth.

The Exposition of the Absolute represents the subject considered separately from any of its properties. It is the Kantian autonomous subject, free from external control of any sort. In Kantian terms, by definition, whatever it does is moral because it acts autonomously—free from outside determination. Likewise, in Kantian terms, whatever it does is diabolically evil, for the moral and the diabolically evil—that which the subject does for its own sake and not out of inclination—are indistinguishable.¹⁸

From Actuality will emerge the entire Subjective Logic, which is a repetition of the Objective Logic and a rebuilding of an actuality in which the subject can recognize itself. "There is no transition from 'actuality' to a more actual structure," Marcuse writes.¹⁹ "There is no going beyond the absolute, only an 'exposition' of it, 'exhibiting what it is.'"²⁰ From now on the theme is development and exposition, not transition into otherness, or even the "positing" of an other.

In the Exposition of the Absolute, Hegel begins with the Absolute as the perfect unity between Inner and Outer. The Understanding therefore proposes that everything has dissolved itself into the Absolute. Neither Essence, Existence, nor Reflection can be distinguished any longer. "Accordingly,

¹⁵ GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT ¶ 17 (A.V. Miller trans. 1977) ("In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the true, not only as substance, but equally as subject"). This is where thought "does not remain simply a negative discounting, but now becomes a positive character of itself as a persisting totality." JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL'S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A COMMENTARY 111 (1981).

¹⁶ HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND § 408 (William Wallace, A.V. Miller trans. 1971). It is arresting that, for Hegel, human subjectivity is *born in madness*. See generally DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND, HEGEL'S THEORY OF MADNESS (1995).

¹⁷ "Hegel's doctrine of the objectivity of essence postulates that Being is the mind that has not yet come to itself." THEODOR W. ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 168 (E.B. Ashton trans. 2000).

¹⁸ On this theme, see Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, *Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?*, 88 CAL. L. REV. 653 (2000). The Exposition of the Absolute will be connected to a Lacanian theme of subjectivity as crime. The subject emerges in a so-called "forced choice." In this primitive psychotic state, the subject exceeds all law. Slavoj Žižek writes: "the very existence of subjectivity involves the 'false', 'abstract' choice of Evil, of Crime—that is, an excessive 'unilateral' gesture which throws the harmonious Order of the Whole out of balance." SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 96 (1999); see also *id.* at 99, 160.

In Kantian terms, the subject is always guilty when it acts. IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON 89 (Allen Wood & George Di Giovanni trans., 1998) ("moral evil . . . brings with it an *infinity* of violations of the law, and hence an *infinity* of guilt . . . , not so much because of the *infinity* of the highest lawgiver whose authority is thereby offended . . . but because the evil is in the *disposition* . . . "); see Joan Copjec, *Introduction: Evil in the Time of the Finite World*, in RADICAL EVIL xiv (Joan Copjec ed., 1996) ("Common to Freud and Kant is the unexpected assertion not only that moral conscience is always certain, but that it is, moreover, certain of only one thing: its guilt"). This is also Hegel's position. *Phenomenology*, *supra* note 15, ¶¶ 398-400. Thus Hegel describes the act as the "original determinacy" and the birth of individuality: "*action* is itself nothing else but negativity." *Id.* ¶ 399.

¹⁹ MARCUSE, ONTOLOGY, *supra* note 4, at 89.

²⁰ *Id.* at 90.

the process of *determining what the Absolute is* has a negative outcome." (530)²¹ The Absolute is merely "the negation of all predicates and [is] the void." (530)²² This is not to say that external reflection cannot discern an essence here or a deceptive appearance there. But it can, with equal ease, demonstrate the finitude and relativity of such determinations. What external reflection cannot do is "to raise either the [predicates] or the negations to a genuine unity." (530)²³ The Absolute must *itself* display this unity. This is the Exposition of the Absolute.

The basic message of the Exposition of the Absolute is that the Absolute is *both* the extremes of the syllogism (inner and outer) *and* the middle term—all in one. Therefore, it is necessary to amend our expositional convention to reflect this fact.

In the prior installments of this work, a diagram was presented in order to record every logical move in the *Science of Logic*. In this diagram, the left side of the page is the side of Being. The right side of the page is the side of Nothing. The Understanding always makes a proposition about the prior "speculative" step. At first, it made its proposition on the left side of the page—the side of Being. Reflection is the assessment of what is *not*. Therefore the Understanding makes a *negative, correlative* proposition on the right side of the page. Now, however, the Understanding has begun to see all three necessary moments at once. It is turning speculative:

[All illustrations can be found
in the Appendix to this Article]

Figure 43(a) **Exposition of the Absolute**

In Figure 43(a), the Understanding now sees "the *absolute form . . .*, each of whose moments is within itself the *totality* and hence, as indifference to the form, is the complete *content* of the whole." (531)²⁴ Nevertheless, the Understanding, as always, makes of the concrete relationship a single identity.²⁵

The Understanding, at first simple and unschooled, has become smarter. In the Doctrine of Being, it only saw immediate identities. By Measure, it had learned to see double—dia-lectically. Understanding at that point morphed into Dialectical Reason. Throughout the first six chapters of Essence, the Understanding continued to be dialectic in character. Now it has registered further progress. It has started to become *notional*. By the time the Actuality chapters are over, the Understanding will coincide with Speculative Reason.

In the Absolute, all distinction vanishes at first. As a result, the Absolute cannot determine or express itself. The Absolute is a dead, silent entity—"the *negative exposition* of the absolute." (531)²⁶

The Exposition of the Absolute is a failure, but it does have a positive side: "for in so far as in it the finite falls to the ground, it demonstrates that [the finite's] nature is to be connected with the absolute, or to contain the absolute within itself." (532)²⁷ The Absolute gives the various determinations their *subsistence*. That is to say, the finite, in spite of its propensity to erase itself, withdraws into the Absolute and therefore participates in eternity. The Exposition of the Absolute "thus arrests the finite before it vanishes and contemplates it as an expression and image of the absolute." (532)²⁸

²¹ "Insofern fällt das Bestimmen dessen, was das Absolute sei, negativ aus." [II:157]

²² "[D]ie Negation aller Prädikate und als das Leere." [II:157]

²³ "[O]hne diese Positionen und jene Negationen zu einer wahrhaften Einheit erheben zu können." [II:157]

²⁴ "[A]bsolute Form . . . jedes an ihm selbst die Totalität und somit, als gleichgültig gegen die Form, der vollständige Inhalt des Ganzen ist." [II:158]

²⁵ Hegel will return to Absolute Form in chapter 27. There, "content" has been abolished. Form has no further place to send its being and so the Logic must be brought to an end.

²⁶ "[D]ie negative Auslegung des Absoluten." [II:159]

²⁷ "[I]nsofern nämlich das Endliche darin, daß es zugrunde gweht, diese Natur beweist, auf das Absolute bezogen zu sein, oder das Absolute an ihm selbst zu enthalten." [II:159]

²⁸ "[H]ält so noch das Endliche vor seinem Verschwinden auf und betrachtet es als einen Ausdruck und Abbild des Absoluten." [II:159]

But, Hegel warns, this positive side is "only an illusory activity." (532)²⁹ That is to say, it is *for us*. For itself, the Exposition of the Absolute is a failure. "Any further determinations that may occur . . . is a nullity that the exposition picks up *from outside* and from which it gains a *beginning* for its activity." (532)³⁰

For this reason, the Exposition of the Absolute "*begins from itself and arrives at itself.*" (532)³¹ It does not account for its own Movement of Reflection, a movement that stands over against it. Exposition of the Absolute is merely the negative of reflection and "something imperfect." (533)³²

Yet the Absolute has swallowed all and therefore contains difference. Difference is movement. Difference must Appear. Dialectical Reason intervenes to suggest that, if the Understanding insists on the unity of the Absolute, it thereby excludes the Movement of Reflection.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 43(b) Movement of Reflection

The Movement of Reflection is self-erasure. It leans to the left side of the page—the side of Being. In Figure 43(a), the Absolute accepted difference, but also destroyed it. Because difference was destroyed, Movement was banished. Movement is "the beyond of the [sublated] manifold differences . . . a beyond which *lies at the back of the absolute.*" (531)³³ This beyond proves that the Exposition of the Absolute is "*only arrived at.*" (533)³⁴ It is "*only the absolute of an external reflection.* It is therefore not the absolute absolute but the absolute in a determinateness." (533)³⁵

Speculative Reason intervenes to point out that external reflection is not merely the beyond of the Absolute. It is simultaneously *in* the Absolute. This double status of the Movement of Reflection and Absolute Hegel names Attribute.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 43(c) Attribute

Attribute stands for the dependence of the Exposition of the Absolute on external reflection. "In the attribute the absolute shows only in one of its moments, a moment *presupposed* and picked up by *external reflection.*" (554)³⁶

B. The Absolute Attribute

Hegel warns that the "absolute absolute" is not before us. This entity will not Appear until the 27th chapter. The Attribute is merely the *relative* Absolute. The relative Absolute is the Absolute in

²⁹ "[N]ur ein Scheinen." [II:160]

³⁰ "Was für weitere Bestimmungen vorkommen . . . ist ein Nichtiges, das die Auslegung von außenher aufnimmt, und woran sie einen Anfang zu ihrem Tun gewinnt." [II:160]

³¹ "[D]as bei sich anfängt, wie es bei sich ankommt." [II:160]

³² "[E]in Unvollkommenes." [II:160] Cf. Chaffin, *supra* note 6, at 154 ("Therefore, as self-related, the attribute is the determinate absolute. Yet the attribute is *also* reflection external to the absolute, since it is only by virtue of this characteristic that it is the determinateness of the absolute.")

³³ "[D]as Jenseits der mannigfaltigen Unterschiede . . . welche dem Absoluten im Rücken liegt." [II:159]

³⁴ "[N]ur angekommen wird." [II:160]

³⁵ "[N]ur das Absolute einer äußern Reflexion." [II:160]

³⁶ "Im Attribute scheint das Absolute nur in einem seiner Momente, als einem vorausgesetzten und von der äußern Reflexion aufgenommen." [II:185]

a form determination. In psychoanalytic terms, the Attribute is the investiture of the subject in the external world. Subjective Attribute is how the subject produces the means by which it might be recognized as a subject by itself (and, in a world of many subjects, by other subjects).

The Attribute, Hegel says, is not merely the product of Reflection. To leave the matter here would be to admit that reflection is permanently external to Attribute. Inner and Outer are, by now, in unity. Reflection has already been shown to be equally *internal* to Attribute. And, furthermore, the Attribute is the *whole content* of the Absolute. There is no "inner" any longer. "The attribute is . . . the absolute as in simple *identity* with itself." (534)³⁷

Hegel compares the Attribute favorably to the World of Appearance and the World In and For Self, shown in Figure 39(b). Each of these two sides was also itself, its other, and the whole of the relation. Nevertheless, Figure 39(b) contained a moment of opposition. Each World insisted on its moment of immediacy against the other. In the Exposition of the Absolute, however, immediacy was reduced to mere illusory being. That is to say, immediacy is an ideality or mere memory of a history long sublated. The "*true and sole subsistence*" is now the totality. (533-34)³⁸

Yet is also true of the Attribute that, since it is the determination of the Absolute, it is "posited as *unessential* subsistence." (534)³⁹ The Understanding now proposes that the Absolute is the unity of all these sublations. Hence, we have:

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 44(a) Attribute as Unessential

Because Attribute is unessential, the Absolute can have multiple Attributes. Every one of them, however, is posited as sublated.

Dialectical Reason intervenes to point out that, in the Attribute as Unessential, the Attribute is held separate from the act of producing it.

[S]ince it is as *inner* form that reflection determines the absolute into attribute, this determining is something still distinct from the externality; the inner determination does not penetrate the absolute; its utterance or expression is, as something merely posited, to vanish in the absolute. (534)⁴⁰

This can be drawn as follows:

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 44(b) Act of Attribution

The Attribute is now merely the "way and manner" (534)⁴¹ of the Absolute. The Absolute is, in effect, alienated from its inessential ways and manners.

³⁷ "Das Attribut ist . . . das Absolute als in der einfachen Identität mit sich." [II:162]

³⁸ "[W]ahres und einziges Bestehen." [II:161]

³⁹ "[D]ie Bestimmung aber, in der es ist, als das unwesentliche." [II:161]

⁴⁰ "[D]ie Reflexion, indem sie als innere Form das Absolute zum Attribut bestimmt, so ist dieses Bestimmen ein noch von der Äußerlichkeit Verschiedenes; die innere Bestimmung durchdringt das Absolute nicht; seine Äußerung ist, als ein bloß Gesetztes am Absoluten zu verschwinden." [II:162]

⁴¹ "Art und Weise." [II:162]

C. The Mode of the Absolute

In Figure 44(a), Attribute was "the absolute as in simple *identity* with itself." (534)⁴² But this implied that Attribute was *negation*, as seen in Figure 44(b). The side designated as [1, 2] is comprised of the two sides of the *and* the middle term that connects them. The side designated as [3], however, is "the reflection which is *external* to the absolute." (535)⁴³ Yet [3] is just as much *in* [1, 2] as *out* of it. Therefore, to the extent that [3] is taken as external, the Absolute is *self-external*—"the loss of itself in the mutability and contingency of being, the accomplished transition of itself into opposites *without the return into itself*; the multiplicity of form and content determinations lacking the character of totality." (535)⁴⁴

In effect, the Absolute is recognized by an external reflection which is nevertheless as much a part *of* the Absolute as it is apart *from* the Absolute. The unity of the Attribute and the alienated Act of Attribution is what Hegel calls the Mode.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 44(c) Mode

Mode represents the absolute externalized. But it is not to be taken merely as the loss of totality. Mode is externality *posited* as externality. The Attributes recognized in the Mode constitute the authentic "way and manner" of the Absolute.

Speculative Reason always names a movement. Accordingly, Mode is "reflective movement . . . posited as reflective movement." (535)⁴⁵ In Mode, the Exposition of the Absolute has "completely run through all its moments." (535)⁴⁶ At first an immediacy, then an opposition, it is now a unity of opposition and immediacy. Only this unity—a self-movement—achieves "absolute identity." (535)⁴⁷ Active Mode is not dealing with something external. Its products (Attributes) are Illusory Beings from which the "self-dissolving" (535)⁴⁸ Absolute returns to itself. In its triplicity, Mode is the "first truly absolute identity" (541) and an "essenceless determination." (541)⁴⁹ In Mode, the distinction between Essence and Appearance has been defeated. "The mode is therefore the externality of the absolute, but equally only as the reflection of the absolute into itself." (541)⁵⁰

What Hegel calls "expounding reflection" (535)⁵¹ is a misleading view of the Absolute—Spinoza's view. Expounding reflection seems to begin from its own determinations which are taken as something external. These it merely *finds*. Its act consists in dissolving these "back into an indifferent identity." (535)⁵² Such an expounding reflection *terminates* its determinations but does not begin them.

The true Absolute contains within itself the determinateness from which the seemingly external determinations begin. Mode has not yet obtained to this originary status. The determinateness of the Exposition of the Absolute belonged to the Movement of Reflection, as seen in Figure 43(b). Through this alone the Absolute is determined as the first identity. Through this alone it has a form. It is not that

⁴² "[D]as Absolute als in der einfachen Identität mit sich." [II:162]

⁴³ "[D]ie dem Absoluten äußerliche Reflexion." [II:162]

⁴⁴ "[D]er Verlust seiner in die Veränderlichkeit und Zufälligkeit des Seins, sein Übergangensein ins Entgegengesetzte ohne Rückkehr in sich; die totalitätslose Mannigfaltigkeit der Form und Inhaltsbestimmungen." [II:162]

⁴⁵ "[A]ls Scheinen, das als Scheinen gesetzt ist." [II:163]

⁴⁶ "[S]o hat sie darin vollständig ihre Momente durchlaufen." [II:163]

⁴⁷ "[A]bsolute Identität." [II:163]

⁴⁸ "[S]ich selbst auflösende." [II:163]

⁴⁹ "[W]esentlose Bestimmung." [II:169]

⁵⁰ "Der Modus ist daher die Äußerlichkeit des Absoluten, aber ebensowohl nur als dessen Reflexion in sich." [II:169]

⁵¹ "[A]uslegende Reflexion." [II:163]

⁵² "[I]n die indifferente Identität nur zurückführt." [II:163]

which merely *is* equal to itself. It is that which posits itself as equal to itself.

The Mode is the Absolute's own reflective movement—a determining. But it is a determining that would make it not an other but only that makes itself what it already is. Externality is a *transparent* externality which is a self-manifestation. This outwardness is equally inwardness. It is a positing that is also absolute being.

So what truth does the Absolute manifest? Simply that the distinction between form and content is dissolved. The "content of the absolute is just this, *to manifest itself*." (536)⁵³ The absolute *is* only as manifestation of itself for itself. "As such it is *actuality*." (536)⁵⁴ In Actuality the in-itself has become for-itself.

Remark

The Exposition of the Absolute, as Hegel has initially described it, stands for Spinozist "substance." In chapter 7, Hegel set forth an extensive commentary on Spinozist thought. There, Hegel emphasized Spinoza's distinction between substance and attribute. The mediating "third" to these two oppositions was "mode" (*i.e.*, intellect)—"that element which is in an other through which it is comprehended." (327)⁵⁵ Mode for Spinoza is "externality as such." (327)⁵⁶ Because "mode" was external, it was the untrue, and "the rigid nature of substance lacks the return into self." (328)⁵⁷

Hegel now says that "Spinozism is a defective philosophy because in it reflection and its manifold determining is an *external thinking*." (536)⁵⁸ For Spinoza, substance is *one*. It lacks any determinateness. Therefore, "the absolute principle" of Spinozism is that "[d]eterminateness is *negation* . . . this true and simple insight establishes the absolute unity of substance." (536)⁵⁹ But Spinoza failed to see that the absolute negates not just its other but itself; thus, Spinozist substance "*does not itself contain the absolute form*." (536)⁶⁰

Hegel concedes that, for Spinoza, substance is the perfect unity of thought and extension (*i.e.*, being). Substance contains thought, "but only in its *unity* with extension." (537)⁶¹ For Spinoza, thought does not separate itself from being but is treated as already separated. Thought is not a reflective *activity*; it fails to return to itself.

Two consequences follow from this failure. First, "substance lacks the principle of *personality*—a defect which has been the main cause of hostility to Spinoza's system." (537)⁶² Personality is

the practical, objective Notion determined in and for itself which, as person, is impenetrable atomic subjectivity—but which, none the less, is not the exclusive individuality, but explicitly *universality* and

⁵³ "[E]ben dies ist der Inhalt des Absoluten, sich zu manifestieren." [II:164]

⁵⁴ "[E]s ist so Wirklichkeit." [II:164] Marcuse says of this passage that it "'translates' and reinterprets the essential Aristotelian definition of Being as *energeia*, as well as defining the character of the movement of actual being." MARCUSE, ONTOLOGY, *supra* note 4, at 91. Hegel expressly invokes Aristotle's *energeia* in the *Lesser Logic*. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC § 142 Remark (William Wallace trans., 1975) [hereinafter cited as LESSER LOGIC].

⁵⁵ "[D]ie Affektionen der Substanz oder für dasjenige, was in einem Andern ist, durch welches es auch begriffen wird." [I:227] This is a paraphrase of Spinozist mode.

⁵⁶ "[D]ie Äußerlichkeit als solche." [I:327] Spinozist mode is equated with Measure in chapter 7.

⁵⁷ "[D]er starren Substantialität die Rückkehr in sich selbst fehlt." [I:337]

⁵⁸ "Der Spinozismus ist darin eine mangelhafte Philosophie, daß das Reflexion und deren mannigfaltiges Bestimmen ein äußerliches Denken ist." [II:164]

⁵⁹ "Die Bestimmtheit ist Negation . . . diese wahrhafte und einfache Einsicht begründet die absolute Einheit der Substanz." [II:164] See Letter 50, in 2 CHIEF WORKS OF SPINOZA 370 (R.H.M. Elwes ed. 1955).

⁶⁰ "[S]omit enthält seine Substanz nicht selbst die absolute Form." [II:164] Absolute form (or method) is the culmination of the *Science of Logic*. See chapter 27.

⁶¹ "[A]ber nur in seiner Einheit mit der Ausdehnung." [II:164]

⁶² "Teils fehlt dadurch der Substanz der Prinzip der Persönlichkeit—ein Mangel welcher vornehmlich gegen das spinozistische System empört hat." [II:164-65]

cognition, and in its other has *its own* objectivity for its object. (824)⁶³

In other words, substance (Hegel's Absolute Idea) properly goes out of itself and returns to itself. Its other is simply itself, and Absolute Idea therefore contains *all* determinations within itself. This feature of self-negation and return (or personality) is missing in Spinozist thought.⁶⁴

Second, cognition is external to substance. What is finite is not derived from substance but remains entirely alien to it. Finite concepts can be dissolved and traced back to substance, but Spinoza cannot travel in the opposite direction by deriving such concepts from substance.

Spinoza's notions of substance, "profound and correct as they are, are [mere] *definitions*, which are *immediately* assumed at the outset of the science." (537)⁶⁵ The absolute cannot be a *first*. It must be the *result*.

Hegel also criticizes Spinoza's notion of "attribute." For Spinoza, attribute can only be comprehended by intellect. Attribute is thus made *dependent* on intellect—an external other. Attribute (like mode) is "only as *vanishing*, not as *becoming*." (538)⁶⁶ Attribute is said to be infinitely plural. "However in what follows only *two* Appear, thought and extension, and it is not shown by what necessity the infinite plurality reduces itself to opposition . . . of thought and extension." (537)⁶⁷ Thought and extension are therefore "adopted *empirically*," not immanently. (537)⁶⁸ Lacking immanency, thought and being are unessential forms of the absolute. "Things" are therefore no more real than thoughts are. Nevertheless, the intellect is *external* to the absolute. The intellect conceives of the absolute first as a world of conceptions and again as a world of things. External reflection makes these distinctions, and it is external reflection again that dissolves these distinctions and drives them back into the all-dissolving absolute. Thus, even though the absolute is supposed to include thoughts, the *movement* of thought is kept external.

The determination of the attribute is first posited in mode or intellect. Yet mode remains mere mode. It is immediately given. Its nullity is not cognized. Spinoza's exposition of the absolute follows with the attribute and ends with the mode. These are merely enumerated sequentially. They are not

⁶³ "[D]er praktische, an und für sich bestimmte, objektive Begriff, der als Person undurchdringliche, atome Subjektivität ist,—der aber ebensowohl nicht ausschließende Einzelheit, sondern für sich Allgemeinheit und Erkennen ist und in seinem Andern seine eigene Objektivität zum Gegenstande hat." [II:484]

⁶⁴ According to Stephen Houlgate:

This, in my view, is the principal difference between Hegel and Spinoza. For Spinoza, being is ultimately substance that is immanent in but also logically *prior* to its modes: it is the immanent *cause* of its modes. For Hegel, by contrast, being is ultimately concept that is wholly identical with its unfolding differences. Those differences belong to and constitute the concept itself. The concept is thus not their logically prior "ground" or "cause": it *is* simply the process of differentiating itself into those differences.

Stephen Houlgate, *Why Hegel's Concept is not the Essence of Things*, 2 CARDOZO J.L. POLICY & ETHICS (2004) (forthcoming); see also *id.* at — ("Hegel's thought could thus be said to be Spinozan metaphysics, freed from the dominance of essence").

⁶⁵ "[T]ief und richtig sie sind, sind Definitionen, welche vornen in der Wissenschaft unmittelbar angenommen werden." [II:165]

⁶⁶ "[N]ur als verschwindend, nicht als werdend." [II:166]

⁶⁷ "Es kommen zwar weiterhin nur die zwei vor, Denken und Ausdehnung, und es ist nicht gezeigt, wie die unendliche Vielheit sich notwendig nur auf den Gegensatz . . . des Denkens und der Ausdehnung." [II:165] Spinoza thought there were infinite attributes but only mentions thought and extension. 1 HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA: UNFOLDING THE LATENT PROCESSES OF HIS REASONING* 117, 215 (1934). Apparently, the infinity of attributes is related to the point that, if we insist that substance is *nothing but* thought and extension, then we assert that substance is finite, when it is supposed to be infinite. Or, in other terms, we illegitimately travel from empirical observation to transcendent reality. To prevent this move, we must leave open the possibility of infinite attributes. See STUART HAMPSHIRE, *SPINOZA* 56-58 (1951).

Michael Inwood thinks Hegel is wrong for claiming that Spinozan attribute belongs to intellect alone. "That this is a misinterpretation of Spinoza is suggested by a fact which Hegel glosses over, that substance has an infinite number of attributes, all but two of which, namely thought and extension, are inaccessible to our intellect and cannot therefore be constituted by it." M.J. INWOOD, *HEGEL* 220 (1983). Hegel's position, however, is that the unnamed attributes do not count. The only named ones are "diverse" from substance and therefore treated by Spinoza as underived "givens." It is not fair to allege that Hegel "glosses over" this point.

⁶⁸ "[E]mpirisch aufgenommen." [II:165]

internally connected.⁶⁹

On refutation of philosophical error. Later in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel, recalling the above criticism of Spinoza, will remind his readers that, though partly false, Spinozism is also partly true. "[O]ne must get rid of the erroneous idea of regarding the system as out and out *false*, as if the *true* system by contrast were only *opposed* to the false." (580)⁷⁰ Spinozan substance did result from essence. It is a genuine philosophical moment. "[T]o that extent the system, is perfectly true; but *it is not the highest standpoint.*" (580)⁷¹ The *true* system cannot be merely opposed to Spinozism, "for if this were so, the system, as this opposite, would itself be one-sided. On the contrary, the true system as the higher, must contain the subordinate system within itself." (580)⁷²

If a philosophy is to be defeated, "it must not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system in question and inconsistent with it." (580)⁷³ A besieged philosophy "need only refuse to recognize those assumptions." (580-81)⁷⁴ Rather, refutation must seize upon an assumption that the philosophy clearly honors, push it to the extreme, and show its destructive implications for the system. "The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent's stronghold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere else and defeating him where he is not." (581)⁷⁵

After its victory, the true system must preserve and honor the defeated philosophy as a genuine moment in the system. Thus, "Spinozism knows how to resolve and assimilate the determinations in which these assumptions conflict with it, so that they appear *in the system*, but in the modifications appropriate to it." (581)⁷⁶

Spinozism itself, however, is one-sided. The only way of refuting Spinozism is to honor it by "recognizing its standpoint as essential and necessary and then going on to raise that standpoint to the higher one through its own immanent dialectic." (581)⁷⁷

Spinozist substance (Hegel's Exposition of the Absolute) will yield the Notion. This result is

⁶⁹ One commentator summarizes Hegel's criticism as follows:

Thinking entails negation for Hegel, and such activity cannot take place in Spinoza's system since (according to Hegel) there is no possibility of accounting for the necessary transference as a kind of *passive* negation—a conscious negation of something other (ein Anderes), but *not* of consciousness itself. But, according to Hegel, it is the activity of *self* negation which is the essential and defining characteristic of self consciousness. Hence, Spinoza's substance-theory is unable to account for the most characteristic feature of subjectivity.

Ernest Wolf-Gazo, *Negation and Contrast: The Origins of Self-Consciousness in Hegel and Whitehead*, in HEGEL AND WHITEHEAD: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY 209 (George R. Lucas, Jr., ed. 1986).

⁷⁰ "[D]araus die schiefe Vortstellung zu verbannen ist, als ob das wahre System dagegen dem falschen nur entgegengesetzt sie." [II:217]

⁷¹ "[I]nsofern ist das System vollkommen wahr.—Aber es ist nicht der höchste Standpunkt." [II:217]

⁷² "[D]enn so wäre dies Entgegengesetzte selbst ein Einseitiges. Vielmehr als das Höhere muß es das Untergeordnete in sich enthalten." [II:217]

⁷³ "[N]icht von Annahmen ausgehen, welche außer jenem Systeme liegen, denen es nicht entspricht." [II:217]

⁷⁴ "Es braucht jene Annahmen nur nicht anzuerkennen." [II:217]

⁷⁵ "Die wahrhafte Widerlegung muß in die Kraft des Gegners eingehen und sich in den Umkreis seiner Stärke stellen; ihn außerhalb seiner selbst angreifen und da recht zu behalten, wo er nicht ist, fördert die Sache nicht." [II:218] Michael Rosen cites these passages to claim that Hegel had the obligation to enter into Kant's system immanently in order to defeat (on which obligation Hegel has defaulted). MICHAEL ROSEN, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND ITS CRITICISM 34 (1982). According to Rosen, Hegel should have accepted Kant's standpoint as to the following: (a) Empirically, a thing either has or has not a property—the law of the excluded middle. (b) With regard to *cosmical* properties, a thing *can* have *and* not have a cosmic property. (c) There is a fixed border between empirical and cosmic properties. Cosmical conceptions for Kant were ideas that relate phenomena to the "absolute totality." IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 231 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans. 1990). Cosmical properties are beyond space and time and therefore have no limit. *Id.* at 294. Empirical properties, however, are limited. So the border, for Kant, is whether space and time apply.

Hegel, of course, thinks that *all* concepts are subject to limit *and* that *all* concepts—cosmic of empirical—are contradictory. The entire *Science of Logic* is aimed at showing these things, though Hegel does not, to my knowledge, address precisely the Kantian border between the empirical and the cosmic. Still, since space and time are for Kant *subjective* factors, is not Kant confessing that the border between empirical and cosmic properties is itself a subjective concept and therefore not a necessary one?

⁷⁶ "Er versteht vielmehr die Bestimmungen, unter welchen diese Annahmen ihm widerstreiten, aufzulösen und in sich ziehen, so daß sie in demselben, aber in dem ihm angemessenen Modifikationen, erscheinen." [II:218]

⁷⁷ "[D]aß sein Standpunkt zuerst als wesentlich und notwendig anerkannt werde, daß aber zweitens dieser Standpunkt aus sich selbst auf den höhern gehoben werde." [II:218]

"the sole and genuine refutation of Spinozism." (581)⁷⁸

II. Actuality

[T]he task nowadays consists not so much in purging the individual of an immediate, sensuous mode of Apprehension, and making him into a substance that is an object of thought and that thinks, but rather in just the opposite, in freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity so as to give actuality to the universal, and impart to it spiritual life.⁷⁹

Actuality, an "event of manifestation."⁸⁰ is absolute form, and absolute form is what "has no content save that of being self-manifestation." (541)⁸¹ "The utterance of the actual is the actual itself" ⁸² And what actuality utters is *its own self-erasure*.⁸³

Hegel compares Actuality with Being and Existence. Being, "the first immediacy," (541)⁸⁴ was a becoming-other with no being-in-and-for-self. In contrast, Existence was the immediacy that proceeded from Ground and from Conditions—"from essence and its reflection." (541)⁸⁵ Existence, however, was "not yet the *posited* unity of reflection and immediacy." (541)⁸⁶

Actuality posits the unity of itself, its other, and the unity of self and other.⁸⁷ Accordingly, the Actual "is not drawn into the sphere of *alteration* by its externality, nor is it the *reflecting* of itself in *an other*." (542)⁸⁸ The Actual states, "I am not *that* (Essence), and that is what I am."

Actuality has its moments, each of which "is a further step in the logical breakdown between the internal and the external."⁸⁹ First, we take the Actual as an immediacy. So viewed, it has no essence—no reflection-into-self. The Actual thing just *is*.⁹⁰ When the moment of immediacy is

⁷⁸ "[D]ie einzige und wahrhafte Widerlegung der Spinozismus." [II:218] Stanley Rosen characterizes Hegel's criticism of Spinoza as follows: "The finite is not reflected into substance because there is no interiority into which it could be received. Consequently, there is no 'third dimension' or Spirit within which substance and its attributes can be unified." STANLEY ROSEN, G.W.F. HEGEL: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF WISDOM 55 (1974). I rather disagree with this characterization. Hegel seems to think there *is* an inner to Spinozist substance; the problem is that it *stays* inner. Furthermore, spirit is not a third to substance and attribute. Spirit *is* substance, which will develop itself out of its subjective interior throughout the last third of the *Science of Logic*.

⁷⁹ PHENOMENOLOGY, *supra* note 15, ¶ 33.

⁸⁰ HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 17.

⁸¹ "[K]einen Inhalt hat, als die Manifestation seiner zu sein." [II:169]

⁸² LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 54, § 142.

⁸³ See HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 55 ("Hegel does not understand manifestation as the 'expression' of something behind it or prior to it").

⁸⁴ "[E]rste Unmittelbarkeit." [II:169]

⁸⁵ "[A]us dem Wesen und dessen Reflexion." [II:169]

⁸⁶ "[N]och nicht die gesetzte Einheit der Reflexion und der Unmittelbarkeit." [II:170]

⁸⁷ John Hoffmeyer, whose book is entirely about Actuality, emphasizes that the structure of this chapter precisely embodies this slogan. HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 16. Actuality is "both the totality of the section and a moment within the section." *Id.* at 18. See also RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD, AUTONOMY AND NORMATIVITY 46 (2001) ("determinacy, determined determinacy and self-determined determinacy").

⁸⁸ "[E]s wird durch seine Äußerlichkeit nicht in die Sphäre der Veränderung gezogen, noch ist es Scheinen seiner in einem Andern." [II:170]

⁸⁹ HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 17.

⁹⁰ George di Giovanni, *The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic*, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON G.W.F. HEGEL 41, 43 (Lawrence Stepelevich ed., 1993). Hegel eloquently denounces this naive view of Actuality:

Actuality and thought . . . are often absurdly opposed. How commonly we hear people saying that, though no objection can be urged against the truth and correctness of a certain thought, there is nothing of the kind to be seen in actuality, or it cannot be actually carried out! People who use such language only prove that they have not properly Apprehended the nature either of thought or of actuality. Thought, in such a case is . . . the synonym for a subjective conception . . . just as actuality . . . is made synonymous with external and sensible existence. This is all very well in common life, where great laxity is allowed in the categories and the names given to them; and it may happen that, e.g., the plan . . . of a certain method of taxation, is good and advisable in the abstract, but that nothing of the sort is found in so-called actuality . . . But when the abstract understanding gets hold of these categories and exaggerates the distinction they imply into a hard and fast line of contrast, when it tells us that in this actual world we must knock ideas out of our heads, it is necessary energetically to protest against these doctrines . . . Ideas are not confined to our heads merely, nor is the Idea . . . so feeble as to leave the question of its actualization . . . dependent on our will. The Idea is rather . . . active as well as actual . . . actuality is not so bad [as] muddle-brained would-be reformers imagine. So far as actuality, as distinguished from mere

emphasized, the reflective background is banished from Actuality. Hegel interprets the banished reflection-into-self as Possibility.⁹¹ At this point, Essence is "capable of being actualized [and] is more precisely thought of as the possibility of the actual."⁹²

In Possibility, the Actual becomes other, but, since it is expressly the unity of itself, its other and the unity of these two, Actuality simply becomes itself when it becomes Possible. These extremes, however, will show that they cannot sustain themselves without the other. They are therefore related to a third term—Necessity.

The moments of Actuality must undergo the usual development of immediacy, duality and unity. The first of these developments is formal. The second is "real." The third is absolute.

A. Contingency, or Formal Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity

Formal Actuality is immediate and unreflected:

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 45(a) Formal Actuality

It simply *is*—a phenomenon, which "cuts itself off from the process that has led up to it . . . For this reason it Appears as something that has no ground. Like anything that *de facto is*, it parades itself as self-sufficient. It has its own presence to guarantee for its possibility."⁹³ Nevertheless, "[i]t is the essence of the actual to be always *more* and *other* than what it is at any point."⁹⁴ Dialectical Reason sees this point and proposes that Formal Actuality is *less* than the totality; it points to the *Possibility* of totality.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 45(b) Possibility

Possibility is here revealed to be the in-itself [2] of Formal Actuality.⁹⁵ "*What is actual is possible,*" Hegel observes (542).⁹⁶ Indeed, the Actuality of a thing proves its Possibility. In Figure 45(b), Possibility and Actuality are in a relation. In Figure 45(a), they were in unity.

Formal Actuality signals the realization that what is possible can only be derived retroactively from Actuality.⁹⁷ Possibilities never actualized are empty talk. Hegel memorably denounces foolish hopes in the *Lesser Logic*:

Appearance, and primarily presenting a unity of inward and outward, from being in contrariety with reason, that it is rather thoroughly reasonable, and everything which is not reasonable must on that very ground cease to be held actual.

LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 54, § 142 Remark.

⁹¹ Di Giovanni, *supra* note 90, at 43 ("[T]o the extent that an object is only possible, it is not actual; to the extent that it is actual, it is no longer merely possible. The meaning of one category excludes that of the other."). Accordingly, Marcuse interprets Hegel's actuality "as a process totally permeated by conflict between possibility and reality." HERBERT MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION 150 (1999).

⁹² JOHN W. BURBIDGE, HEGEL ON LOGIC AND RELIGION: THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 40 (1992).

⁹³ Di Giovanni, *supra* note 90, at 47.

⁹⁴ MARCUSE, *supra* note 4, at 96.

⁹⁵ See HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 68 ("Far from being made subordinate to actuality, possibility is actuality's essence").

⁹⁶ "Was Wirklich ist, ist möglich." [II:171]

⁹⁷ JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE — (1998).

[A]ny content, however absurd and nonsensical, can be viewed as possible. It is possible that the moon might fall upon the earth tonight; for the moon is a body of separate from the earth—and may as well fall down upon it as a stone thrown into the air does. It is possible that the Sultan may become Pope; for, being a man, he may be converted to the Christian faith, may become a Catholic priest, and so on. In language like this about possibilities, it is chiefly the law of the sufficient ground or reason which is manipulated in the style already explained. Everything, it is said, is possible, for which you can state some ground. The less education a man has, or, in other words, the less he knows of the specific connections of the objects to which he directs his observations, the greater is his tendency to launch out into all sorts of empty possibilities . . .⁹⁸

Possibility isolated from Actuality is empty. It is "*posited* as negative." (543)⁹⁹ Because it is negative, Possibility always has two moments. First, it is a positive concept unto itself. As the in-itself of Actuality it is [2], but [2] always implies the immediacy of [3]. As [3], Formal Possibility is "the relationless, indeterminate receptacle for everything whatever. In the sense of this formal possibility *everything is possible that is not self-contradictory*; hence the realm of possibility is a boundless multiplicity." (543)¹⁰⁰ Possibility isolated from Actuality is *diverse*. Diverse things negate themselves and pass over to opposition. In isolation, Possibility is contradictory and turns into its opposite. "Possibility is therefore in its own self contradiction, or it is *impossibility*." (544)¹⁰¹

Possibility implies its own lack. It points to an other—Actuality—needed to complete itself. Possibility is ostensibly merely a moment in a totality. It is merely "the *ought-to-be* of the totality of form." (543)¹⁰² In effect Possibility confesses that its content might be *impossible*. It is possible that the Chicago Cubs might win the pennant. This statement implies clearly enough that it is equally possible that they might not. Possibility *relates* these two otherwise indifferent remarks. Possibility is therefore the unity of the possible and the impossible. It is therefore a contradiction and an *impossibility*.

A contradiction, Possibility sublates itself. It announces, "I am not Actuality." But by this very act of self-effacement, Possibility *actualizes* itself. Hence, Speculative Reason sees Possibility as an Actuality and vice versa.¹⁰³ Taken as immediate, Actuality also announces it is not Actual, only Possible. Speculative Reason names this self-renouncing activity to be Contingency.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 45(c) Contingency

"The contingent is an actual that at the same time is determined as merely possible, whose other or opposite equally is." (545)¹⁰⁴ Accordingly, Contingency has two sides. First, it is immediate or Formal

⁹⁸ LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 54, § 143 Remark.

⁹⁹ "[G]esetzt als Negatives." [II:171]

¹⁰⁰ "[D]er Verhältnislose, unbestimmte Behälter für alles überhaupt.—Im Sinne dieser formellen Möglichkeit ist alles möglich, was sich nicht widerspricht; das Reich der Möglichkeit ist daher die grensenlose Mannigfaltigkeit." [II:171] The definition of possibility as the non-contradictory is Aristotle's. G.R.G. MURE, A STUDY OF HEGEL'S LOGIC 134 (1950). Mure claims generally that the last parts of the Actuality chapters "closely follows Aristotle's analysis in terms of potential and actual, contingent and necessary." *Id.* at 149.

¹⁰¹ "Die Möglichkeit ist daher an ihr selbst auch der Widerspruch, oder sie ist die Unmöglichkeit." [II:172] Michael Inwood overlooks this passage when he writes, "If the contradictory is not impossible, then what is? Hegel provides no satisfactory answer to this question." INWOOD, *supra* note 67, at 449 (footnote omitted).

¹⁰² "[D]as Sollen der Totalität der Form." [II:172]

¹⁰³ Stephen Houlgate writes, "Hegel thus agrees with the tradition that necessity lies in the foreclosing of possibility; but the twist he adds to this is that necessity lies in the foreclosing of the possibility that possibility itself might *not* be something actual." Stephen Houlgate, *Necessity and Contingency in Hegel's Science of Logic*, 27 OWL OF MINERVA 37, 42 (1995). In fact, the foreclosure (or actualization) of Possibility is more directly Contingency in Figure 45(c), which the Understanding, in Figure 46(a), will rename Necessity.

¹⁰⁴ "Das Zufällige ist ein Wirkliches, das zugleich nur als möglich bestimmt, dessen Anderes oder Gegenteil ebenso sehr ist." [II:173]

Actuality—[5] which is translated into [7]. As such, it has no ground. It simply *is*. It is "only Existence." (545)¹⁰⁵ Second, the Contingent is a positedness [4, 5, 6]. As such it is grounded. The Contingent is therefore simultaneously grounded and not grounded.¹⁰⁶ Causes may conspire to bring the Contingent into existence (in which case it is grounded). Or perhaps no cause precedes the Contingent. The Contingent may never be actualized; if so it is ungrounded.

The Contingent is the name of this movement of Actuality into Possibility and back—"the *posited* unmediated *conversion* of inner and outer, or of reflectedness-into-self and being." (545)¹⁰⁷ Since Contingency is this movement, it cannot properly articulate *unity*.¹⁰⁸ By now, however, the extremes are themselves, their other, and the unity between these extremes. Accordingly, Actuality and Possibility are Contingents as well as immediates. Each is nothing but the act of manifesting itself. Given the nature of Formal Actuality and Possibility, the Understanding proposes that Contingency is Necessity: "*Contingency is the matrix out of which necessity arises.*"¹⁰⁹

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 46(a) Formal Necessity

Figure 46(a) is a reproach to those who see Hegel as a philosophical totalitarian. Figure 46(a) shows that Contingency is part of the totality. Contingency is what is Necessary.¹¹⁰ Uncertainty is built in the system. Our future is *not* in the stars but in ourselves to rough-hew as we will. It is *necessary* that we be free, *i.e.*, contingent.

Necessity stands for the proposition that what *is* ain't necessarily so. Perhaps things are what they are through happenstance, or perhaps they *are* necessarily so. What is necessary is that things be subject to this very ambiguity.¹¹¹

Here is what I think Hegel's point is *not*. A familiar nursery rhyme goes:

For want of a nail the shoe was lost,
For want of a shoe the horse was lost,
For want of a horse the rider was lost,
For want of a rider the battle was lost,
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

From the perspective of history, the loss of the kingdom necessarily required the loss of the nail, which, at the time, was a highly contingent matter. Everyone's actual state is brought about by a series of

¹⁰⁵ "[N]ur die Existenz." [II:174]

¹⁰⁶ HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 23, 70.

¹⁰⁷ "[D]as gesetzte, unvermittelte Umschlagen des Innern und Äußern." [II:174] Reflectedness-into-self refers to the act of Possibility announcing it is not Actual and of Actuality announcing it is not possible. In so announcing, each brings into unmediated "being" its own actuality.

¹⁰⁸ HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 41.

¹⁰⁹ Di Giovanni, *supra* note 90, at 48.

¹¹⁰ EMIL L. FACKENHEIM, THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION IN HEGEL'S THOUGHT 19 (1967) ("Hegel is so far from denying the reality of contingency as actually to be the only speculative philosopher in history to attempt a demonstration of its inevitability") (footnote omitted); MARCUSE, ONTOLOGY, *supra* note 4, at 97 ("Necessity therefore is at bottom contingency!"). For this reason, John Burbidge suggests that Hegel's philosophy is always retrospective; it cannot predict the contingencies of nature and history. BURBIDGE, RELIGION, *supra* note 92, at 69 ("Unreflective existence is thus not alien to thought, but a moment in its own process. For this reason, Hegel argues that contingency is necessary").

¹¹¹ Burbidge thinks that there are three "necessities" for Hegel. This is the first. JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL'S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A COMMENTARY 195 (1981) ("This sense of an immediate necessity is implicit in any Appeal to self-evidence"). The second Necessity will be what is produced by a complete set of all Conditions—Real Necessity, shown in Figure 46(c). The third, most adequate Necessity is what exists when its contrary is self-contradictory. "Such a self-referential, negative determination specifies inherent (rather than external) conditions sufficient to rule out its own falsity." *Id.* at 196.

inexplicable, improbable circumstances. But this is not what Hegel means. Rather, he means that the determination of a finite thing (*e.g.*, today's lost kingdom) is itself a contingency. Maybe it *is* lost, maybe it will come roaring back, like the Borbons in Spain. "[W]hat simply is, is not itself the necessary." (546)¹¹²

B. Relative Necessity, or Real Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity¹¹³

In Figure 46(a), Necessity's moments were formal; Actuality and Possibility constantly turned into one another. Formal Necessity was "indifferent to its differences." (546)¹¹⁴ It confirmed that things are contingent, but it could not say whether a thing is possible or actual. It merely named the flux of formal moments, declining to distinguish between them. As a flux, Formal Necessity did not have the form of self-subsistence.

Dialectical Reason remembers that Necessity is one with Possibility. Formal Necessity is now renamed Real Actuality and is paired with Real Possibility.¹¹⁵

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 46(b) Real Possibility

"Real" is a phrase Hegel uses indicate mediation and determinability.¹¹⁶ In Real Possibility, Necessity is negated Possibility and Possibility is negated Necessity. No term makes sense except as the negation of its other.

According to Dialectical Reason, if Formal Necessity is isolated as [1], its content [2] is likewise isolated, on the side of Being. [2] is therefore Possibility. In conjunction with [1], [2] stands for the diverse determinations of the Actual thing "and is a *manifold* content in general." (546)¹¹⁷ Real Actuality [1, 2] is therefore "the thing of many properties, the existent world." (546)¹¹⁸ This notion ties into Hegel's view, presented in chapter 1, that knowledge is a collaboration between the subject and the object. Each of these is a force contributing to the middle term of knowledge. Thus, Real Actuality is the *forceful* object. "What is actual *can* act; something manifests its actuality through what . . . it produces." (546)¹¹⁹

Real Actuality is more advanced than Existence as proto-thing. Actuality preserves itself in the manifold (whereas the "thing" of Existence dissolves).¹²⁰ Actual externality is authentic. "Its relationship to another something is the manifestation *of itself*." (546)¹²¹ It is no mere Appearance; rather it is "exempted from transition."¹²² Meanwhile, Possibility is the in-itself [2] of Real Actuality.¹²³

¹¹² "Das Seiende selbst ist so nicht das Notwendige." [II:175] This point is lost on Michael Inwood, who thinks that necessity and contingency are mutually exclusive categories. Inwood reads Hegel as trying to *compartmentalize* contingency, so that *mostly* there is necessity. INWOOD, *supra* note 57, at 356-61. In fact, *everything* in being is contingent.

¹¹³ Hyppolite calls this section "perhaps the most illuminating of all the dialectics of essence." JEAN HYPOLITE, LOGIC AND EXISTENCE 174 (Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen trans., 1997).

¹¹⁴ "[G]egen ihre Unterschiede gleichgültig." [II:175]

¹¹⁵ Perhaps this justifies Hoffmeyer's comment that Necessity "gives primacy to actuality over possibility," and is for this reason inadequate. HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 70.

¹¹⁶ BURBIDGE, RELIGION, *supra* note 92, at 44. In chapter 1, "reality" was Quality paired with Negation. Real Measure in chapter 8 signalled the Measure that *was* specified but also *specified* its other in return. Real Ground stood for the realization that Ground and Grounded define each other.

¹¹⁷ "U]nd ist mannigfaltiger Inhalt überhaupt." [II:175]

¹¹⁸ "[D]as Ding von vielen Eigenschaften." [II:175]

¹¹⁹ "Was wirklich ist, kann wirken; seine Wirklichkeit gibt etwas kund durch das, was es hervorbringt." [II:176]

¹²⁰ See chapter 13.

¹²¹ "Sein Verhalten zu anderem ist die Manifestation seiner." [II:176]

¹²² LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 54, § 142.

¹²³ See MARCUSE, REASON, *supra* note 91, at 150 ("Possible is only that which can be derived from the very content of the real").

This in-itself, Hegel says, is "*pregnant with content*." (547)¹²⁴ "Pregnant with content" is a phrase Hegel uses to signal a unity of Outer and Inner. Therefore, Formal Possibility is an immediacy, but it also suffuses through Formal Actuality. It thereby produces Real Actuality as [1, 2] and Real Possibility as [2, 3].

As isolated, Formal Possibility stood for the proposition that "something is not internally self-contradictory." (547)¹²⁵ But Formal Possibility referred both to what was Actual and what was not. It was therefore empty and contradictory. Now *context* is to be considered. The Real Possibility of a thing is "the existing multiplicity of circumstances which are connected with it." (547)¹²⁶ As such, Real Possibility is beyond what is merely Possible. Real Possibility is Actual. Because Real Possibility invokes the entire context—the entire world—it is truly "pregnant with content."

Hegel, then, presents two different versions of Possibility. First, a Possible thing is one that is formally identical with itself and not self-contradictory. Yet it is equally true, on the law of sublation, that the thing *is* contradictory. It is a negative unity of diverse properties, which are themselves diverse and hence self-eradicating. Such a thing necessarily falls to the ground. From this perspective, the thing is "*merely a possible*." (548)¹²⁷ In Figure 46(b), [1] and [3] are viewed by Dialectical Reason as diverse entities. From this perspective, Possibility and Actuality—the existing multiplicity—are indifferent to [2]. Ever since chapter 11, diverse entities have developed the habit of self-erasure. Accordingly, Possibility and Actuality must vanish. Each is *neither* Possible *nor* Actual.¹²⁸

The second version of possibility is Real—dispersed Actuality and Possibility taken as a whole. Possibility is essentially otherness. Formal Possibility was "transition into a sheer other." (549)¹²⁹ The truth of Real Possibility, however, is that it contains its other. It is therefore itself Necessity.

When so taken, Real Possibility constitutes the *Totality of Conditions*. "When all the conditions of something are completely present, it enters into actuality." (548)¹³⁰ A single actual thing implies the entire world of actual determinate things.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

¹²⁴ "[I]nhaltvolle." [II:176]

¹²⁵ "Etwas sich in sich nicht widerspreche." [II:176]

¹²⁶ "[D]ie daseiende Mannigfaltigkeit von Umständen, die sich auf sie Beziehen." [II:176]

¹²⁷ "[N]ur ein Mögliches." [II:177] These thoughts perhaps explain the distinction between nature and spirit. "The non-spiritual and inanimate," Hegel writes, "are the Notion only as *real possibility*." (829-30) ("Das Nichtgeistige und Nichtlebendige dagegen ist der konkrete Begriff nur als reale Möglichkeit." [II:490]) When the non-contradictory side of Real Possibility manifests itself, the things of nature endure. But when the contradictory side manifests itself, nature falls apart, leaving ground for subjectivity to emerge. Accordingly,

cause is the highest stage in which the concrete Notion, as a beginning in the sphere of necessity has an immediate existence; but it is not yet a subject that maintains itself as such even in its actual realization. The *sun*, for example, and in general all inanimate things, are determinate concrete existences in which real possibility remains an *inner* totality and the moments of the totality are not *posited* in subjective form in them. (830)

"[D]ie Ursache ist die höchste Stufe, in der der [sic] konkrete Begriff als Anfang in der Sphäre der Notwendigkeit ein unmittelbares Dasein hat; aber sie ist noch kein Subjekt, das als solches sich auch in seiner wirklichen Realisierung erhält. Die Sonne z.B. und überhaupt alles Nichtlebendige sind bestimmte Existenzen, in welchen die reale Möglichkeit eine innere Totalität bleibt und die Momente derselben weder in subjektiver Form in ihnen gesetzt sind." [II:490]

If the sun and other such things are things, they attain this status "by means of *other* corporeal individuals." (830) ("durch andere Körperindividuen erlangen" [II:490])

¹²⁸ George Di Giovanni interprets this moment as standing for the proposition that a thing is *actual* from the standpoint of the present but a *possible* insofar as the thing grounds future circumstances to come. Di Giovanni, *supra* note 90, at 50. Hence, the disappearance of Actuality into Possibility is a nascent version of Cause and Effect, which are taken up in the next chapter. Meanwhile, John Burbidge characterizes the paradox of Real Actuality and Real Possibility as follows: "Real possibility is that which, to be possible, contradicts itself neither formally nor materially. Yet real possibility can be a simple self-identity neither formally nor materially." BURBIDGE, RELIGION, *supra* note 92, at 45.

¹²⁹ "Übergehen in schlechthin anderes." [II:178]

¹³⁰ "Wenn alle Bedingungen einer Sache vollständig vorhanden sind, so tritt sie in Wirklichkeit." [II:177] This is Hegel's second Necessity, according to Burbidge. BURBIDGE, LOGIC, *supra* note 15, at 195-96.

Figure 46(c)
Real Necessity
(Totality of Conditions)

When the Totality of Conditions is present, a thing is *necessarily* what it is. "[G]iven a contingent beginning *x, y* necessarily follows."¹³¹ It is now "impossible to distinguish possibility and actuality."¹³² We have "a going-together-with-itself." (548)¹³³ "Real possibility no longer has over against it *such an other*, for it is real in so far as it is itself also actuality." (548-49)¹³⁴

Real Possibility's duality is now sublated. Formal Actuality and Possibility have diffused into each other; [5] and [6] displace themselves into [4] and hence into [7]. In this negation of Real Actuality and Possibility, identity-with-self is achieved. "[I]n its sublating it is thus within itself the recoil of this sublating, it is *real necessity*." (549)¹³⁵

Real Necessity is still merely relative—not free. Real Actuality as such cannot exist on its own. It depends on all the circumstances implied by Real Possibility. Real Actuality is still merely a Possibility, as is Real Possibility. Real Necessity, the unity between the two, is likewise still merely possible—"the totality which is *still external to itself*." (549)¹³⁶ Real Necessity has not yet broken free of otherness. In *form* it is Necessary, but "as regards content it is limited" (550)¹³⁷—hence Contingent.

If a Really Necessary thing is Contingent, because it depends on its own force *and* the presence of all the circumstances in which its force must be expressed, how is it a Necessity at all? The answer is that Real Necessity is not a *thing*. It is an *event*—the name of the self-erasing move of Real Actuality and Real Possibility. It is necessary that these diversities manifest their inability to sustain the thing on their own.¹³⁸ Yet in this self-erasure, "*presupposing* and the *self-returning movement* are still separate." (550)¹³⁹ Because of this separateness, Hegel says that "necessity has not yet *spontaneously determined itself into contingency*." (550)¹⁴⁰ In other words, Contingency is merely Possible. It must become Actual.¹⁴¹

Real Necessity therefore exhibits externality. "Whatever it is, it could have been otherwise."¹⁴² Externality stands for form, and, to the extent it stands over against externality, Real Necessity has a content that is indifferent to its form. The Real Necessity of a thing is therefore some inner integrity, but the thing might have unessential forms which some external reflection might perceive. "The really necessary is therefore any limited actuality which, on account of this limitation, is also only a

¹³¹ HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 71.

¹³² BURBIDGE, RELIGION, *supra* note 15, at 46.

¹³³ "[E]in Zusammengehen mit sich selbst." [II:178]

¹³⁴ "Die reale Möglichkeit hat nicht mehr ein solches Anderes sich gegenüber, denn sie ist real, insofern sie selbst auch die Wirklichkeit ist." [II:178]

¹³⁵ "[S]ie so in ihrem Aufheben der Gegenstoß umgekehrt dieses Aufhebens in sich selbst ist, ist sie die reale Notwendigkeit." [II:178]

¹³⁶ "[D]ie sich noch äußerliche Totalität." [II:179]

¹³⁷ "[D]em Inhalte nach ein Beschränktes sei." [II:180] See Houlgate, *supra* note —, at 44.

¹³⁸ Marcuse cites this moment as proof of Hegel's leftwing political agenda:

The circumstances that exist in the old form are thus conceived not as true and independent in themselves, but as mere conditions for another state of affairs that implies the negation of the former . . . The concept of real possibility thus develops its criticism of the positivist position out of the nature of facts themselves. Facts are facts only if related to that which is not yet fact and yet manifests itself in the given facts as a real possibility.

MARCUSE, REASON, *supra* note 91, at 152. Though Marcuse refers to Real Possibility, his point goes to Real Necessity.

¹³⁹ "[D]ieses Voraussetzen und die in sich zurückkehrende Bewegung ist noch getrennt." [II:179] Miller's translation corrects Hegel's grammar here. Of the original, John Hoffmeyer remarks, "Hegel's use of the singular verb 'is' anticipates the unity that will emerge from this externality." HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 41.

¹⁴⁰ "[D]ie Notwendigkeit hat sich noch nicht aus sich selbst zur Zufälligkeit bestimmt." [II:179]

¹⁴¹ Hoffmeyer calls attention to the parallel between Real Necessity (or, in its guise as Figure 47(a), Absolute Necessity) and Determining Reflection—shown in Figure 25(c). Determining Reflection stood for the acknowledgement that presupposition is all that there is. Likewise, Real Necessity stands for the absolute inability of anything to ground itself. HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 47.

¹⁴² BURBIDGE, RELIGION, *supra* note 92, at 47.

contingent in some other respect." (550)¹⁴³

C. Absolute Necessity

The Understanding now proposes that Real Necessity is a unity between the Actual thing and its entire context—"the unity of necessity and contingency." (550)¹⁴⁴ Hegel calls this immediate unity Absolute Actuality.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 47(a) Absolute Actuality (Absolute Necessity or Contingency)

Figure 47(a) "*in its first simplicity* is actuality," (550)¹⁴⁵ Hegel says. It is Absolute because its being-in-itself is Necessity. It is "actuality which can no longer be otherwise" (550)¹⁴⁶—"absolute self-mediation." (555)¹⁴⁷

Nevertheless, as the unity of itself and Possibility, Absolute Actuality is "only an *empty* determination, or, it is *contingency*." (551)¹⁴⁸ It is "a unity that does not do justice to the difference of actuality and possibility . . ." ¹⁴⁹ In its immediate form, it is "a *mere possibility*, something which can equally be *otherwise*." (551)¹⁵⁰ Whatever it is, though, it is absolute. It has the capacity to be determined *absolutely* as either an Actual or as a mere Possible.¹⁵¹ These Hegel refers to as "free, inherently necessary actualities." (553)¹⁵²

Absolute Actuality is arguably an advance over Real Necessity. There, Contingency was merely implicit. Contingency for Real Necessity was "the sublatedness of actuality in possibility" and vice versa. (551)¹⁵³ Now Contingency comes to be.¹⁵⁴ Actuality, as Real Necessity, was an *act* of self-erasure. The Understanding sees this and names this act Absolute Actuality, which, ironically, happens to be Contingency. What is Absolutely Actual, then, is Contingency.

At this point, Hegel claims, the "distinction of *content* and form itself has . . . vanished." (551)¹⁵⁵ Form "has penetrated all its differences and made itself transparent." (551)¹⁵⁶ But Dialectical Reason points out that the Absolutely Necessary is *two* things—Actuality and Possibility. Each of these is identical to the other.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

¹⁴³ "Das real Notwendige ist deswegen irgendeine beschränkte Wirklichkeit, die um dieser Beschränktheit willen in anderer Rücksicht auch nur ein Zufälliges ist." [II:179-80]

¹⁴⁴ "[D]ie Einheit der Notwendigkeit und Zufälligkeit." [II:180]

¹⁴⁵ "[I]n ihrer ersten Einfachheit ist Wirklichkeit." [II:180]

¹⁴⁶ "Wirklichkeit, die nicht mehr anders sein kann." [II:180]

¹⁴⁷ "[A]bsolute Vermittlung seiner mit sich selbst." [II:185]

¹⁴⁸ "[N]ur eine leere Bestimmung, oder sie ist Zufälligkeit." [II:180]

¹⁴⁹ HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 40.

¹⁵⁰ "[E]iner bloßen Möglichkeit, zu einem, das ebensowohl auch anders sein." [II:180]

¹⁵¹ This might be compared to the Understanding's interpretation of Something. In Figure 3(a), it took Something to be *either* Something or Other. Now the Understanding takes Actuality to be the *unity* of either/or—the very capacity to be actualized (or not). "It is indifferently the one or the other. Since it is both, that indifference is 'indifference over against itself.'" HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 40, citing *Science of Logic* at 551.

¹⁵² "[F]reien, an sich notwendigen Wirklichkeiten." [II:183] The freedom of these actualities, however, is a one-sided freedom that Hegel will soon criticize. HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 47.

¹⁵³ "[D]as Aufgehobensein der Wirklichkeit in der Möglichkeit und umgekehrt." [II:181] John Hoffmeyer finds significance in Hegel's use of a dative case. Actuality is sublated "in" Possibility, not "into." This signals that Actuality stays what it is even as it is "in" (not "moves into") Possibility. HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 42. The subtle grammar is a sign of Actuality's True Infinity.

¹⁵⁴ BURBIDGE, RELIGION, *supra* note 92, at 49 ("This new content of thought [Contingency] is what is actual period").

¹⁵⁵ "Der Unterschied von dem Inhalte und der Form selbst ist . . . verschwunden." [II:182]

¹⁵⁶ "So hat die Form in ihrer Realisierung alle ihre Unterschiede durchdrungen und sich durchsichtig gemacht." [II:181] Hoffmeyer warns, "Hegel does not mean by transparency that we see through the illusory surface of things to the reality behind them. The surface of things is their depth, and their depth is their surface." HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 46.

Figure 47(b) Free Actualities

From this perspective, Absolute Necessity is blind—"something merely *inner*." (581)¹⁵⁷ It cannot tell what it is. Its essence is "*light-shy*, because there is in these Actualities no *reflective movement*, no reflex, because they are grounded purely in themselves alone." (553)¹⁵⁸ But whichever it is—Actual or Possible—it is *necessarily* so.¹⁵⁹

Speculative Reason intervenes to observe that a Free Actuality is a diversity—an "absolute negativity." (553)¹⁶⁰ It self-erases. Accordingly, "Necessity . . . sacrifices movement to fixity," which yields "illusory notions of freedom."¹⁶¹ "[T]he absolutes perish," Hegel says, and then "their *essence* will break forth in them and reveal what *it* is and what *they* are." (553)¹⁶² What we have is "the *freedom* of their reflectionless . . . immediacy." (553)¹⁶³

The Actualities (or beings) are identical with themselves in their negation. Hegel calls this unity Substance—"[t]he *blind* transition of necessity." (553)¹⁶⁴

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 47(c) Substance

The lesson of Substance is that Contingency has traditionally been thought of as that which is beyond reason.¹⁶⁵ But Absolute Necessity is Contingency itself.¹⁶⁶ Logic generates irrationality as part of reason itself. It is rational that irrationality should exist.¹⁶⁷ "[F]or Hegel there are many things in the world that are not explicable by philosophy because, from the perspective of absolute reason, they are ultimately contingent and without ground."¹⁶⁸ Therefore, philosophy is condemned to "the endless process of overcoming the contingency that reasserts itself at the end of any process of explanation."¹⁶⁹ Every necessity is therefore a contingency.

Substance is still flawed. It stands for manifestation—for self-erasure of a finite entity. Substance can only articulate the relation between the free actualities and itself "by presupposing something external."¹⁷⁰ Substance still remains dependent on externality and hence is Contingent. "The movement beyond substantial otherness can only be a movement beyond necessity. For Hegel, to move beyond

¹⁵⁷ "[D]as heißt Innerliches." [II:218]

¹⁵⁸ "[D]as Lichtscheue, weil an diesen Wirklichkeiten kein Scheinen, kein Reflex ist, weil sie nur rein in sich gegründet." [II:183]

¹⁵⁹ As Burbidge puts it, "The distinction between possible and actual is reintroduced, not as a relation of contradictory opposites where both cannot be present at the same time, but as a relation of subcontraries whose meanings are distinct and opposite yet explicitly related within a larger universe of discourse." BURBIDGE, RELIGION, *supra* note 92, at 49.

¹⁶⁰ "[D]ie absolute Negativität." [II:183]

¹⁶¹ HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 53.

¹⁶² "[I]hr Wesen wird an ihnen hervorbrechen und offenbaren, was es ist und was sie sind." [II:183]

¹⁶³ "[D]ie Freiheit ihrer scheinlosen Unmittelbarkeit." [II:183] This is the third Necessity of Hegel. BURBIDGE, LOGIC, *supra* note 15, at 196.

¹⁶⁴ "Das blinde Übergehen der Notwendigkeit." [II:184]

¹⁶⁵ Di Giovanni, *supra* note 90, at 42.

¹⁶⁶ See Houlgate, *supra* note —, at 48 (Absolute Necessity's lesson "is that the being and ceasing to be of finite, contingent things is absolutely *necessary* . . ."). Houlgate goes on to point out that "if being is only thought of as the realm of what is *necessary*, then . . . there is nothing that history can be *except* 'the slaughter-bench on which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states and the virtue of Individuals have been sacrificed.'" *Id.*, citing G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 21 (J. Sibree trans. 1991). Freedom, however, transcends necessity and is the very goal of history.

¹⁶⁷ *Id.* at 52; see also BURBIDGE, LOGIC, *supra* note 15, at 215 ("true knowledge can and must comprehend its contrary—excessive stupidity . . .").

¹⁶⁸ Houlgate, *supra* note —, at 42.

¹⁶⁹ Di Giovanni, *supra* note 90, at 53; see also MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AND NON-SENSE 63 (Hubert L. Dreyfus & Patricia Allen Dreyfus trans., 1964) (Hegel "started the attempt to explore the irrational and to integrate it in an expanded reason which remains the task of our century").

¹⁷⁰ HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 50

necessity is to move to freedom."¹⁷¹

III. The Absolute Relation

Substance is now before us. Classically, Substance is "a subject of predication or bearer of attributes that cannot itself be borne by anything else. [It is] an enduring substratum of change."¹⁷² For Hegel too Substance is the subsistence of semblance, "the final unity of essence and being." (555)¹⁷³ Substance, in Hegel's philosophy, stands for the proposition that it is Appearance all the way down. There is no mysterious "beyond" that grounds Appearance. Appearance grounds itself. Appearance manifested—or Actuality—is now finally in and for itself. Substance does nothing but manifest itself and it does this by erasing itself.¹⁷⁴

The Understanding proposes that Substance is Absolute Relation—a unity in which all the moments of Substance Appear together.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 48(a) Absolute Relation (Unity of Substance and Accident)

Here, as before, the Understanding sees *all* the moments of the Notion. Absolute Relation is itself, its other and the unity of the two. Triunity is present in each extreme as well as in the unity of the extremes.¹⁷⁵

Even while it adheres to the notional form, Absolute Relation must undergo the usual moments of development—the moment of immediacy, the dialectical "real" moment, and the unity of these two. Absolute Relation in its immediacy is the relation of Substance and Accident. Here, the "absolute illusory being" (554)¹⁷⁶ immediately vanishes—and becomes—within itself. Dialectical Reason contrasts the being-for-self of the Absolute Relation with its own other. At this point, the Absolute Relation is *real*. This is the relation of Cause and Effect.¹⁷⁷ This relation devolves into a Spurious Infinity, wherein

¹⁷¹ *Id.* at 51. Hoffmeyer suggests that Substance—the final product of the chapter—is "not deterministic for two reasons. First, the content of the determination is contingency. Second, the determination is not a process of unfolding from some prior given. The absence of any such given is what distinguishes freedom from necessity." *Id.* at 71 (footnotes omitted). In fact, Substance is determined *and* not determined. It still depends on externality—the totality of conditions it faces. Substance will graduate into the Subject *not entirely free* but *not entirely determined*. The matter will leave off ambiguously. For this very reason, Actuality is not the end of the Logic.

¹⁷² HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: AN INTERPRETATION AND DEFENSE 214 (1983).

¹⁷³ "[D]ie letzte Einheit des Wesens und Seins." [II:185] In his translation, Arnold Miller translates *Schein* as "illusory being" instead of semblance. He is sometimes criticized for his translation. John Burbidge, for example, suggests "seeming" is a better translation. BURBIDGE, *supra* note 92, at 248 n.4. While Miller's translation is better at the beginning of Essence (because Illusory Being erases itself), by now Burbidge's choice is superior. There is nothing "illusory" about Substance. Rather, Substance is the Appearance or semblance of Essence itself.

¹⁷⁴ Hegel compares Substance to light: "Just as the *light* of nature is neither *something* nor a *thing*, but its being is only its showing or shining . . . , so manifestation is self-identical actuality." (554) ("Wie das Licht der Natur nicht Etwas, noch Ding, sondern sein Sein nur sein Scheinen ist, so ist die Manifestation die sich selbst gleiche absolute Wirklichkeit" [II:185])

¹⁷⁵ In the *Jena Logic*, Hegel identifies this unified account of Substance as the *soul*. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE JENA SYSTEM, 1804-5: LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS 147 (John W. Burbidge & George di Giovanni trans. 1986) ("As this negative *one* that excludes itself and in this exclusion is self-equivalent, the soul is substance . . .").

¹⁷⁶ "[A]bsoluten Scheines." [II:185]

¹⁷⁷ Hegel will later say that the passage of substantiality to cause and effect proves that substantiality is not yet objective. In other words, Cause and effect are subjective attributes of an object: "in so far as the one object is posited in the form of subjective unity as active cause, this no longer counts as an *original* determination but as something *mediated*; the active object has this its determination only by means of another object." (715) ("Insofern daher das eine Objekt in der Form der subjektiven Einheit als wirkende Ursache gesetzt ist, so gilt dies nicht mehr für eine ursprüngliche Bestimmung, sondern als etwas Vermitteltes; das wirkende Objekt hat diese seine Bestimmung nur vermittelt eines andern Objekts" [II:364])

The *true* object will be described in Mechanism (chapter 22). There, the object will manifest "the truth of the causal relationship, namely that the cause, which is supposed to be the original and self-subsistent factor is essentially effect." (715)

it is impossible to say which extreme is Cause and which is Effect. Speculative Reason will point out that the two extremes are in a relation of Reciprocity. At this point, "the indiscernability of determiner and determined factor transforms their relation into one of *self-determination*."¹⁷⁸ "[T]his *posited unity* of itself in its *determinations* which are *posited as themselves the whole . . . is then the Notion*." (555)¹⁷⁹ At the point where the Notion is derived, active substance "*acts*, that is, it now *posits*, whereas previously it only *presupposed*." (578)¹⁸⁰ Reciprocity ends the Objective Logic and begins the Subjective Logic.¹⁸¹

A. The Relation of Substantiality

At first, Absolute Relation is "not *being* as such, but *being because* it is, being as absolute self-mediation." (555)¹⁸² This is the Cartesian moment of self-certainty: "I think therefore I am." There is nothing behind Substance. It is because it is. It subsists in and for itself, and of this it is certain.

But, just as Necessity reveals itself to be Contingency, so Substance reveals itself to be Accidents. "[T]he accident *manifests* the *wealth* of substance as well as its *power*." (627-28)¹⁸³ Indeed, Substance is *nothing* but manifestation.¹⁸⁴ It must Appear, and what it manifests is Contingent, or Accidental. Substance is "*reflective movement*." (555)¹⁸⁵ After it moves into Accident, Substance is still with itself and so is "only the *positedness* that is identical with itself." (555)¹⁸⁶ Tying this to the Cartesian point, Accidents are the uncontrolled blind thoughts that belong to but are separate from the ego. Yet, Hegel makes clear, non-conscious things have Substance, too. This is the being-for-self of a perceived thing—that which escapes our detection. This unconscious Substance logically must reveal itself in its Accidents. We are not yet at the realm of conscious, rational thought, even though our current theme is Applicable to the unconscious life of the mind.

Because Substance is simple self-manifestation, Accident endures, even as individual Accidents vanish. Substance is a Becoming—a unity that names a ceaseless activity which is forever present. In this movement (which Hegel oddly calls *actuality*),¹⁸⁷ the one moment shows itself in the other moment. Accident is Absolute Relation and vice versa. In Cartesian terms, our thoughts are the proof of our Actuality.

In Absolute Relation, the relation of Substance and Accident exhibits the unity of Being and Essence. Being was immediacy in general that could not sustain itself. It erased itself in favor of Essence. Essence was the pure reflective movement of denying its own Being. By denying itself, Essence came to be. Like Being, Essence constantly passes away, but its Being must go somewhere on the law of sublation. The result is Substance—revealed to be nothing but its own passage to Accident

("die Wahrheit des Kausalitätsverhältnisses erwies, daß die Ursache, die das An- und Fürsichseiende sein soll, wesentlich ebensowohl Wirkung, Gesetzsein ist" [II:364]) Or, to put the matter in different terms, in primitive Cause and Effect, Cause meets itself in Effect. But in Objectivity, Cause (Subjective End) discovers that Effect is yet another Cause; the two Subjective Ends must collaborate in the Realized End. See chapter 24.

¹⁷⁸ WINFIELD, *supra* note 88, at 46.

¹⁷⁹ "[D]iese gesetzte Einheit seiner in seinen Bestimmungen, die als das Ganze selbst und damit ebensowohl als Bestimmungen gesetzt sind, ist alsdann der Begriff." [II:185]

¹⁸⁰ "[S]ie wirkt, d.h. sie ist nun das Setzen, wie sie vorher das Vorraussetzen war." [II:215]

¹⁸¹ This chapter can be viewed as covering the Kantian analogies of experience. TAYLOR, *supra* note 3, at 286. These are permanence (Hegel's Substance), succession (Causality), and co-existence (Reciprocity). CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, *supra* note 75, at 122. Michael Inwood questions whether Causality is the opposite of Substance. INWOOD, *supra* note 67, at 296 ("Only rarely does the second term of a triad seem to be the opposite of the first. In what sense, for example, is causality the opposite of substantiality or quantity that of quality?"). Taylor's point provides the answer. Succession implies the sublation of permanence. A king who lives forever can have no successor.

¹⁸² "[N]icht das Sein als solches ist, sondern das Sein, das ist, weil es ist, das Sein als die absolute Verttlung seiner mit sich selbst." [II:185]

¹⁸³ "[D]ie Akzidenz manifestiert den Reichtum der Substanz sowie deren Macht." [II:269]

¹⁸⁴ See MARCUSE, *supra* note 4, at 99 ("we can never comprehend substance except through the totality of its accidents").

¹⁸⁵ "[S]cheinen." [II:186]

¹⁸⁶ "[N]ur das mit sich identische Gesetzsein." [II:186]

¹⁸⁷ "[A] Spinozistic term that Hegel Appropriates." George di Giovanni, *The Anti-Spinozism of Hegel: The Transition to Subjective Logic and the End of Classical Metaphysics*, 2 CARDOZO J.L., POLICY & ETHICS (2004) (forthcoming).

and its manifestation *in* Accident. As Iain Macdonald puts it, Substance

gathers up a diversity of mutually indifferent differences, negates these differences as differences, and binds them together in a unity. The unity in question is not . . . a relation of conjunction or collection, but rather the very principle of negation by which a unification of difference is possible. In other words, substantiality is a way of describing purely self-determining universality; it is at once absolute determinateness and simple identity.¹⁸⁸

Accordingly, Substance has two aspects. First, it is "the *simple identity of being*." (556)¹⁸⁹ Figure 48(a) shows the self-identity that ordinary Cartesian thinking takes consciousness to be. Such a self-identity is pure Possibility. Dialectical Reason, however, insists that Substance and Accident are different. Substance itself must contain this second principle of difference.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 48(b) Substance v. Accident

Speculative Reason in turn sees that, when it comes to Substance and Accident, all we have before us is *movement*—or the sheer Power (*Macht*) of Substance. Substance may be different from Accident, Speculative Reason observes, but it is also the same. It is nothing *but* Accident. We therefore have movement from Accident to Accident.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 48(c) Power (Substantiality)

Substance is nothing but the necessity of self-manifestation. Substance "has *necessity* for its specific mode of relationship." (577-78)¹⁹⁰ What is manifested is a great string of Accidents. But Accidents cease to be. Every ceasing to be is a withdrawal of being to *somewhere*, and this "somewhere" is *enduring* Substance. Accident, Hegel says, withdraws to itself—into its Possibility. But this in turn withdraws from itself to itself as Accident. The production of Accident is *creative* power.¹⁹¹ The withdrawal from this product is *destructive* power. Yet they are the same Power: "the creation is destructive and the destruction is creative." (556)¹⁹²

Meanwhile, the Accidents that Absolute Relation produces are "things" on their own. Once created, they are indifferent to each other. To the extent they *do* exercise power over one another, it is really the power of Substance at work. The relation of things is a *creation*. But it is also a

¹⁸⁸ Iain Macdonald, *The Concept and Its Double: Power and Powerlessness in Hegel's Subjective Logic*, 2 CARDOZO J. L., POLICY & ETHICS (2004) (forthcoming). Justus Hartnack writes, "Hegel's substance neither is nor could be a cause . . . A concept cannot meaningfully count as a cause." JUSTUS HARTNACK, AN INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL'S LOGIC 80-81 (Lars Aagaard-Mogensen trans., 1998). In so asserting, Hartnack assumes a mechanistic notion of cause, wherein billiard balls, but not thoughts, can necessitate a new reality. In fact, Substance is nothing but self-manifestation, and therefore it is the spontaneous *causer* of Accidents. Nevertheless, Hartnack correctly emphasizes that Substance is *nothing* without Accidents, so that Accidents are in some sense the cause of Substance—the two are in reciprocal relation. But this is to jump ahead to Hegel's analysis of Cause and Effect, which devolves into Reciprocal Action. For the moment Accidents are *dead* things which Substance blindly *causes*. Stated otherwise, Substance is the *ground* of Accidents, while the reciprocal relation is not yet posited.

¹⁸⁹ "[D]ie einfache Identität des Seins." [II:187]

¹⁹⁰ "[D]ie bestimmte Verhältnisse der Substanz die Notwendigkeit ist." [II:214]

¹⁹¹ Cf. 1 HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA: UNFOLDING THE LATENT PROCESSES OF HIS REASONING 421-22 (1934) ("Power . . . means to Spinoza the ability to exist and the ability to bring things into existence").

¹⁹² "[D]as Schaffen zerstörend, die Zerstörung schaffend." [II:187]

destruction.¹⁹³

In Figure 48(b), no real difference is yet present between Substance and Accident. Substance is not yet posited according to its Notion.¹⁹⁴ When Dialectical Reason distinguishes Substance in itself as opposed to Substance as totality of Accidents, Substance as Power is indirectly revealed. Power, a middle term, is the positive persistence of the Accidents in their negativity. The extremes have no subsistence on their own, except to the extent they are held together by the Power of Substance.

Substantiality is another name for the movement between Accident and Accident. Substantiality is the Absolute Relation as immediately vanishing.¹⁹⁵ Substantiality relates itself to itself, but not as a negative. It is the immediate unity of power with itself. Substantiality is "in the *form* only of its *identity*, not of its *negative essence*." (557)¹⁹⁶ Only the negative vanishes. The moment of identity does not.

Meanwhile, Being (Accidentality) is in itself Substance through the Power that puts it forth. But it is not posited as identical with Substance. "Substance is not subject so long as its differentiations are mere accidents, contents adding nothing to the identity of substance, which, for its part, can provide no determinate principle for its own modifications."¹⁹⁷ The Power relation is only the "inner of the Accidents;" (557)¹⁹⁸ these exist only *in the Substance*. The speculative meaning of Substantiality is this—Substance manifests itself as formal Power. The differences are not substantial.

Substantiality is the *cause* of the Accidents, which are both substantial and *not* substantial. The relation of substantiality therefore passes over into the relation of causality.

B. The Relation of Causality

Substance is non-transitory Power—power over itself only. Nevertheless it posits determinations about itself and distinguishes itself from them, just as the thinker distinguishes herself from her thoughts. The thinker, then, is the negative of thought. The thoughts are just Accidents, and the thinker feels alienated from them. But, in announcing, "I am not what I thought," the thinker shows what she *is*—thought.

In this reflective move ("I think, therefore I both am and am not"), Substantiality is on both sides of the equation. Accident as separate from Substantiality is Effect. Substantiality as united with Accident is Cause. Together, the Understanding proposes that Substantiality is Cause and Effect¹⁹⁹—a sustaining *power* to cause that is also invested in Effect.²⁰⁰

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

¹⁹³ A related idea from economics is that creative production of a commodity is also a destruction of some other opportunity—an opportunity cost.

¹⁹⁴ When a thing is identical with its Notion, then the thing is true; "it is what it can be, fulfilling all its objective possibilities." MARCUSE, *supra* note 91, at 25.

¹⁹⁵ According to Marcuse:

The final reality in which the antagonisms are resolved Hegel terms 'the Absolute.' At this stage of his philosophical development he can describe the absolute only negatively. Thus, it is quite the reverse of the Universal Apprehended by the common sense and understanding; it "negates" common-sense reality in every detail, so that the absolute reality has no single point of resemblance to the finite world.

MARCUSE, REASON, *supra* note 91, at 47.

¹⁹⁶ "[I]n der Form nur ihrer Identität, nicht ihres negativen Wesens." [II:188]

¹⁹⁷ Richard Dien Winfield, *From Concept to Judgement: Rethinking Hegel's Overcoming of Formal Logic*, 50 DIALOGUE 53, 57 (2001).

¹⁹⁸ "[I]nneres der Akzidensen." [II:188]

¹⁹⁹ LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 54, § 153 ("The way understanding bristles up against the idea of substance is equalled by its readiness to use the relation of cause and effect").

²⁰⁰ Taylor complains, "it is not clear how Hegel thinks he has done it"—*i.e.*, why Substance endures because of Causality. TAYLOR, *supra* note 3, at 289. To my mind, the transition is clear. Substance is the name for self-manifestation in external Accidents. This Power is what endures. Its name is Causality. End of story.

Figure 49(a) Formal Causality

(a) Formal Causality

At first Cause is primary. It puts forth Effects, which are "sublated substantiality." (558)²⁰¹ Effect is "only something *posited*." (558)²⁰² Yet Cause without Effect is nothing. Each requires the other: "the two are *one* actuality." (558)²⁰³

Cause is more advanced than that which produces Accidents. Accidents instantly vanish. But Effects endure so that Cause can endure. Effect is indeed the whole of Cause (and vice versa).²⁰⁴ In psychological terms, the thinker is now proud of her clever thoughts and does not feel alienated from them.

Dialectical Reason observes that Cause and Effect are supposed to differ from each other:

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 49(b) Cause and Effect

These in turn are opposed to the speculative moment; "substance as the non-positing original." (559)²⁰⁵

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 49(c) Original Substance

Hegel describes Figure 49(c) in these terms: "Because substance as absolute power is the return into itself, yet this return is itself a *determining*, it is no longer merely the *in-itself* of its accident but is also *posited* as this in-itself." (559)²⁰⁶ In other words, Cause and Effect more clearly announce their self-caused destruction than did Accident. And destruction *is* Substance: "It is therefore as cause that substance first has actuality." (559)²⁰⁷

Before us is Humean causal skepticism. In psychological terms, the thinker [7] is the Cause of Cause and Effect. Cause on its own cannot cause itself. Nor is Effect its own Cause. All we have is the

²⁰¹ "[A]ufgehobene Substantialität." [II:189]

²⁰² "[N]ur ein Gesetztes." [II:189]

²⁰³ "[B]eides ist Eine Aktuosität." [II:189]

²⁰⁴ Taylor remarks:

accidents are self-standing; and hence . . . they must be seen as in causal relation to each other. And thus the problem arises of finding our way back: of showing through the causal relation itself, that is the relation of the accidents among themselves, their inherence in the self-grounding totality, which is defined as *causa sui*, being which is because it is.

Id. at 288-89. While this captures something of the current steps in the Logic, there is room for complaint. First, individual accidents are *not* self-standing, but Accident as such is. Even so, why does it follow that, if accidents are self-standing, they must cause each other? (The answer is that Substance is a True Infinite that shows what it is by showing what it is not—Accident. And Accident implicitly does the same, thereby causing Substance. Accident as such is therefore substantial.) Also, there is no particular reason to say that we must *go backwards* to find causality. Causality is simply what is implicit in Substance. The exposition of the implicit is always a *progressive* move in the Logic.

²⁰⁵ "[D]ie Substanz als nicht gesetztes Ursprüngliches." [II:190]

²⁰⁶ "Weil sie als absolute Macht Rückkehr in sich, aber diese Rückkehr selbst Bestimmen ist, so ist sie nicht mehr bloß das An-sich ihrer Akzidenz, sondern ist auch gesetzt als dies Ansichsein." [II:190]

²⁰⁷ "Die Substanz hat daher esrt als Ursache Wirklichkeit." [II:190]

movement between Cause and Effect. As we shall see, Cause and Effect are a Spurious Infinity—a point already made in chapter 2.²⁰⁸ There, Hegel analyzed Kant's third antinomy, which states alternately that (1) everything has a cause, and (2) there is an uncaused (free) thing. Hegel's earlier point was that, since Kant is wed to self-identity, each antinomical side is finite. All one could do is alternate between two finites. This alternation is now precisely shown in Figure 49(c). This alternation is, in effect, the Cause of Cause and Effect.

Substance is Cause, and, by definition, Cause must act; its sole function is to manifest Effects. Cause is therefore just as much Effect as it is Cause. "Consequently, effect contains nothing whatever that cause does not contain. Conversely, cause contains nothing which is not in its effect. Cause is cause only in so far as it produces and effect, and effect is nothing but this, to have a cause." (559)²⁰⁹

(b) The Determinate Relation of Causality

This section considers Cause and Effect as it is viewed by common sense. Its purpose, I think,²¹⁰ is to "solve" Kant's famous third antinomy, according to which, either (1) there are uncaused things,²¹¹ or (2) everything has a cause.²¹² Unlike Kant's first two "mathematical" antinomies,²¹³ which present opposites that cannot both be true, the third and the fourth²¹⁴ "dynamic" antinomies are not, strictly speaking, contradictions, because the two positions exist on different levels. The notion that everything has a cause exists at the level of phenomena. The notion that there is an uncaused (free) being exists at the level of transcendental noumena. We cannot prove the transcendental level to be true, but we are licensed to believe it. This license allows for the entire *Critique of Practical Reason*.²¹⁵

For Hegel, incommensurability between the phenomenal and the noumenal is unacceptable. Rather, the Spurious Infinity of Cause and Effect is *logically connected* to the notion of the free, uncaused thing. One side of the antinomy implies the other.

Hegel begins by reviewing the progress that resulted in Original Substance. In Figure 49(a), Cause and Effect were the same thing—an immediacy. In Figure 49(b), Cause and Effect were considered as diverse. In their diversity, they fall apart and are extinguished. If they are *distinguished*, they are distinguished only externally. Cause and Effect in this state are "indifferent to the relation of cause and effect." (560)²¹⁶

Figure 49(c) represents the self-erasure of Cause and Effect; these could not sustain themselves without the aid of an outside power. Formal Causality therefore lost its power. Causality is, ironically, contingent on a Humean third for subsistence. Contingency is the relation of Causality in its "*reality and finitude*." (560)²¹⁷

Formally, Causality is "the infinite relation of absolute power whose content is pure

²⁰⁸ "[A] cause which had no effect would not be a cause, just as an effect which had no cause would no longer be an effect. This relation yields, therefore, the infinite progress of causes and effects." (151) ("eine Ursache, die keine Wirkung haben sollte, ist nicht Ursache, wie die Wirkung, die keine Ursache hätte, nicht mehr Wirkung. Dies Verhältnis gibt daher den unendlichen Progreß von Ursachen und Wirkungen." [I:141])

²⁰⁹ "Die Wirkung enthält daher überhaupt nichts, was nicht die Ursache enthält. Umgekehrt enthält die Ursache nichts, was nicht in ihrer Wirkung ist. Die Ursache ist nmur Ursache, insofern sie eine Wirkung hervorbringt, und die Ursache ist nicht als diese Bestimmung, eine Wirkung zu haben, und die Wirkung nichts, al dies, eine Ursache zu haben." [II:191]

²¹⁰ Citing Hegel's analysis of causality as an example, Adorno remarks, "In the realm of great philosophy Hegel is no doubt the only one with whom at times one literally does not know and cannot conclusively determine what is being talked about, and with whom there is no guarantee that such a judgment is even possible." ADORNO, *supra* note 17, at 89.

²¹¹ "Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of freedom is also necessary to account fully for phenomena." CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, *supra* note 75, at 252.

²¹² "There is no freedom. Everything hAppens solely according to the laws of nature." *Id.* at 252.

²¹³ These are: the world either has or has no beginning in time and space, and things either or are not infinitely divisible. They are deemed mathematical. *Id.* at 297-98.

²¹⁴ There is or there is not a necessary being (God).

²¹⁵ The "practical" is that which rests on the concept of freedom. *Id.* at 198.

²¹⁶ "[G]egen das Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung gleichgültig ist und äußerlich an ihr hat." [II:191]

²¹⁷ "[R]ealität und Endlichkeit." [II:191]

manifestation or necessity." (560)²¹⁸ That is, Cause is in the business of producing Effect and therefore *is* Effect as much as it Cause. But *finite* Causality, as it *really* is, has a merely given content "and exhausts itself in an external difference," (560)²¹⁹ even though its true content is to be identical with Effect.²²⁰

Causality in its real mode is merely "an *analytic* proposition." (560)²²¹ In judgments of causation,

[i]t is the *same fact* which presents itself once as cause and again as effect, there are something subsisting on its own account [Cause] and here as positedness or determination in an other [Effect]. Since these determinations of form are an *external* reflection, it is, *in point of fact*, the tautological consideration of a *subjective* understanding to determine a phenomenon as effect and from this to ascend to its cause in order to comprehend and explain it; it is merely a repetition of one and the same content; there is nothing else in the cause but what is in the effect. (560)²²²

Thus, rain is the cause of wetness, pigment the cause of color. These tautologies show that the distinction between Cause and Effect is externally imposed. By themselves, Cause and Effect cannot sustain themselves as distinct. The form of Causality (necessity) is distinct from the content of it (contingency).²²³

In some very difficult passages, Hegel suggests that every thing is indifferent to its determination as Cause or Effect,²²⁴ and from this can be deduced the idea of Original Substance—the free, uncaused thing. This advanced type of Substance causes itself. Every "thing" has it; everything is at bottom free. This is true not just of conscious things, but of all things.²²⁵

Hegel begins by proposing that, even if Cause and Effect are subjective, the form, taken on its own, has a content.²²⁶ The *formal* content of Cause and Effect is the dialectical point that Cause and Effect are different—precisely the opposite of the true content of Cause and Effect (according to which they cannot be distinguished without self-destruction). Yet this content nevertheless implies that Cause and Effect are related. This implicit identity is an immediacy—a Substrate. Hence, the Understanding reinterprets Figure 49(c) as follows:

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 50(a) Substance as Substrate

²¹⁸ "[D]as unendliche Verhältnis der absoluten Macht, deren Inhalt die reine Manifestation oder Notwendigkeit ist." [II:191] Recall that an infinite relation is one in which an entity becomes something else while remaining what it is. Thus, Cause becomes Effect while remaining Cause.

²¹⁹ "[U]nd verläuft sich als ein äußerlicher Unterschied." [II:191]

²²⁰ Finite Substance, Hegel says, is disconnected from reflectedness. Reflectedness is said to be an immediate Actuality. It will be recalled that, when Formal Actuality Appeared, it stood over against reflective background, which was identified with Formal Possibility. See Figure 45(a).

²²¹ "[E]in analytischer Satz." [II:192]

²²² "Es ist diesselbe Sache, welche sich das eine Mal als Ursache, das andere Mal als Wirkung dastellt, dort als eigentümliches Bestehen, hier als Gesetzsein oder Bestimmung an einem Andern. Da diese Bestimmungen der Form äußerliche Reflexion sind, so ist es die des Sache nach tautologische Betrachtung eines subjektiven Verstandes, eine Erscheinung als Wirkung zu bestimmen und davon zu ihrer Ursache aufzusteigen, um sie zu begreifen und zu erklären; es wird nur ein und derselbe Inhalt wiederholt; man hat in der Ursache nichts anderes als in der Wirkung." [II:192]

²²³ Later, in Hypothetical Judgement ("if A, then B"), Hegel will revisit Cause and Effect, "but here they are no longer relationships of *self-subsistent sides*." In chapter 20, the sides "are essentially only moments of one and the same identity." (653) In chapter 18, the sides still insist on subsisting against the other side.

²²⁴ This will be a major theme of Mechanism in chapter 22.

²²⁵ Much later, Hegel will identify cause as "the highest stage in which the concrete Notion, as a beginning in the sphere of necessity has an immediate existence. But it is not yet a subject." (830)

²²⁶ "The form determination is also content determination; cause and effect, the two sides of the relation, are, therefore, also *another content*." (563) ("Die Formbestimmung ist auch Inhaltsbestimmung; Ursache und Wirkung, die beiden Seiten des Verhältnisses, sind daher auch ein anderer Inhalt" [II:194])

Because of this substrate, a thing is *open* to being made a Cause or Effect, even while it is indifferent to this relationship.²²⁷ For example, water can be either rain (Cause) or wetness (Effect).²²⁸

Because of the externality of the Cause-Effect relation, a thing can be assigned the role of Cause or Effect. To the extent that things are Causes or Effects, they are such only because they participate in this implicit relation. A relation with another sustains them as Causes or Effects.

"But this thing," Hegel writes, "is not only substrate but also substance, for it is identical subsistence only *as subsistence of a relation*." (563)²²⁹ The thing, for this reason, is Substance.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 50(b) Finite Substance

Substance, it will be recalled, was the unity between Absolute Necessity and Contingency. In other words, it is *necessary* that Cause and Effect, as they exist empirically, be a Contingency dependent upon the force of a will. Left to their own devices, they are just Spurious Infinity. The Cause of causal determination, therefore, is the middle term—Original Substance. This middle term first was Substrate but now is "*finite* substance." (563)²³⁰

Finite entities erase themselves. So the reason Substrate gives way to Finite Substance is that, as Substrate, it is indifferent when external reflection deems it Cause or Effect. Substrate is what it is on its own—subject to Limit and therefore Finite. It causes its *own* demise, regardless of external reflection. And *that* is why Substrate is Substance. Finite Substance is "negative relation to *self*." (563)²³¹

Original Substance in Figure 49(c) was the Cause of the Causality. But it denied its own originative role. It purported to "find" Causality in nature. In short, the relationship announces, "I am not Causality," thereby proving it *is* Causality. It is therefore a positedness—an entity dependent on another—"because it is determined as an *immediately* actual." (563)²³² That is to say, the relationship banishes reflectiveness to its other.²³³ *Every* determination, Hegel insists, participates in this denial of its own Causality. It exports Causality to the Substrate. But Substrate too denies its own Causality. The Substrate of Figure 50(a) announces, "I am not Cause," thereby proving it *is* the Finite Substance of Figure 50(b).

Furthermore, the only thing that subsists in Finite Substance is this denial of its own Causal power:

[C]ausality is external to it; and therefore causality itself constitutes its *positedness*. Now since it is causal substance, its causality consists in relating itself negatively to itself, therefore to its positedness and external causality. The action of this substance therefore begins from an externality, liberates itself from this external determination; and its return into itself is the preservation of its immediate existence and the sublation of its posited external, hence of its causality as such. (563)²³⁴

²²⁷ Hegel usually employs the term "substrate" when he wishes to communicate an unsatisfactory transcendental relationship between some unknowable beyond and some phenomenal Appearance. See Figure 21(b).

²²⁸ According to an earlier Hegel, "This absence of relationship in the causality relation is what justified Hume in denying the necessity that . . . ought to lie in [causality], and in explaining it as a mere illusion". JENA LOGIC, *supra* note 176, at 53.

²²⁹ "Aber dieses Ding ist nicht nur Substrat, sondern auch Substanz, denn es ist das identische Bestehen nur als des Verhältnisses." [II:195]

²³⁰ "[E]ndliche Substanz." [II:195]

²³¹ "[N]egative Beziehung auf sich." [II:195]

²³² "[W]eil es als unmittelbar Wirkliches bestimmt ist." [II:195]

²³³ See chapter 17.

²³⁴ "Zweitens ist ihm die Kausalität äußerlich; diese macht somit selbst sein Gesetzsein aus. Indem es nun ursachliche Substanz ist, besteht seine Kausalität darin, sich negativ auf sich, also auf sein Gesetzsein und äußere Kausalität, zu beziehen. Das Wirken dieser Substanz fängt daher von einem Äußern an, befreit sich von dieser äußern Bestimmung, und seine Rückkehr in sich ist die Erhaltung seiner unmittelbaren Existenz und das Aufheben seiner gesetzten, und damit seiner Kausalität überhaupt." [II:195]

To translate, Finite Substance is implicit in Formal Cause and Formal Effect. Each of these entities announces that it is not Cause (or Effect). The *true* causality is external to it. This denial of Cause and Effect proves that the implicit Finite Substance is powerful. It *is* Causality. What it causes is self-erasure, or negative relation-to-self—"the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true." (835)²³⁵ Therefore, what seemed external (Causality) is now internal. This internalization preserves the immediate existence of finite Substance and preserves Causality as such.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 50(c) **Internalized Causality**

Hegel illustrates this with the example of a moving stone. A stone that moves is cause. Movement is a determination which the stone has. It also contains many other determinations—color, shape, etc. These belong to the *immediacy* of the stone. Causality, in contrast, is a *relation* between the stone and something else. The immediate qualities do not enter into the Causality of the stone. From the perspective of Causality, the stone's immediate existence is an externality.

The non-causal properties belong to the immediacy of the stone, but the stone's Causality is implicated in a positedness—a relation to other. But this other is as much the stone as the immediate properties of the stone. Hence, Causality belongs to the stone itself. Furthermore, the subsistence of the stone is

negative relation-to-self. Its causality, which is directed against itself as positedness or as an externality, consists therefore in sublating this [externality] and by *removing* it to return into itself, hence to that extent to be *not* self-identical in its *positedness*, but only to restore *its abstract originativeness*. (564)²³⁶

To put this in other words, the stone acts on itself. The stone is therefore Cause *and* Effect. What it causes is its own immediacy of self. As a result, the stone is an uncaused thing—a free being. It is self-identical, but *not* as a positedness. It is *truly* self-identical. In short, Causality as a concept denies its own power and, through that denial, confirms its own power. Causality devolves to self-Causality.

Hegel gives a second example of rain. Rain is the cause of wetness. But wetness *is* the same water as rain. Causality is imposed on this water. Some other force (heat leading to evaporation) has lifted it into the air and put it in a cloud. Once in the cloud it is prepared to be rain, the cause of wetness. This imposition of Causality is an offense to the immediate qualities of the water which do not participate in the Causality. Heaviness is one of those qualities. Evaporation (the Cause of rain's Causality) offends heaviness. Causality consisted in removing heaviness. When heaviness is restored, it rains. The return of heaviness constitutes the sublation of Causality. Having rained, the water is wetness, not Causality. Nevertheless, the immediacy of the water is restored with the death of Causality. This is, presumably, a self-Causality (though Hegel says so only with respect to the rolling stone, not to the rain).

Infinite regress. Hegel next discusses the familiar regress in which every Cause is an Effect produced by yet another Cause—one side of Kant's third antinomy. This regress comes about because Causality is external to itself. In Figure 49(b), Cause cannot identify itself as Cause on its own. In fact, it announces that it is *not* Cause, and so it banishes its Being to [2], which implies [2, 3]. [2, 3] is therefore Cause, not [1]. Yet [2, 3] was supposed to be Effect. In fact, [2, 3] is *both* Effect and Cause.

²³⁵ "[D]er innerste Quell aller Tätigkeit, lebendiger und geistiger Selbstbewegung, die dialektische Seele, die alles Wahre an ihm selbst hat, durch die es allein Wahres ist." [II:496]

²³⁶ "[N]egative Beziehung auf sich.—Seine Kausalität, welche sich auf sich das Gesetzsein oder als ein Äußeres richtet, besteht daher darin, es aufzukehren, somit insofern nicht in seinem Gesetzsein identisch mit sich zu sein, sondern nur seine abstrakte Ursprünglichkeit wiederherzustellen." [II:196]

Being Cause, taken as [3], it must have its being elsewhere—in some other Effect [1, 2]. And so the Spurious Infinity begins.²³⁷ What endures in the Spurious Infinity was the ceasing-to-be of the Finite. Here Cause constantly ceases to be of its own accord. Hence, the true self of Cause is [2] and ultimately [7], which causes its own self—the infinite regress.

The case is the same with Effect, which likewise produces an infinite regress. Cause is externally imposed on the Effect and "loses its causality therein." (565)²³⁸ That is, Cause does not cause the Effect, but the external will does. Hence, in causing, empirical Cause is not Cause at all. Meanwhile, Effect announces that it is not Effect and is indifferent to this attribution. Effect "arrives at a substrate which is substance, an originally self-related subsistence." (565)²³⁹ In other words, Effect as [3] in Figure 49(b) renounces [2], which becomes [7] in Figure 49(c). [7] is indifferent to [3] (substrate) but is really the Substance of it, as Effectuality is imposed on the caused thing. The substrate is really the Cause of Effect, not the empirically identified Cause.

Hegel warns that there are now two effects which must not be confounded. The first is the externally discovered effect. The second is the implicit effect of the self-causing Substance, a product of reflection-into-self. Only the first gives rise to the spurious infinity of the endless causal chain.

What has developed in the move to determinate Causality and beyond? Formal Causality was extinguished in Effect. That Cause and Effect extinguished each other was in fact their unity. In empirical Cause and Effect, the unity is merely implicit. This implicit unity is an immediate, compared to empirical Cause and Effect.

There are two determinations of this immediacy. First, the immediacy is the in-itself of Cause and Effect—[2] in Figure 49(b). [2] implies [7]. And in [7] is the infinite regress of Cause and Effect to which the moving stone or rain is indifferent. In this infinite regress, Cause [5] and Effect [6] inhere as distinct forms. Yet they are implicitly one [4]. But this in-itself is an externality. Cause and Effect are external to themselves. They are both united and divided. Cause has an Effect and at the same time *is* an Effect. The Effect which Cause *has* and the Effect which cause *is* are different. The first is Contingent; the latter is the speculative result.

The outcome is that Cause is not merely extinguished in Effect. In being extinguished, Cause resurrects itself in the Effect. There is no external transition here.²⁴⁰ The becoming-other of Original Substance is its own positing. The identity of empirical Cause and Effect was only substrate. Now it is determined as presupposition. It is posited over against the active Causality. The reflection of this Causality was previously external. Now it stands in a relation to this reflection.

(c) Action and Reaction

The Understanding now proposes that Substance has two natures— passive and active.

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 51(a)

²³⁷ "But because causality here is self-external causality, equally it, too, does not return into itself in its effect, but therein becomes *external* to itself; *its* effect again becomes a positedness in a substrate—as in *another substance*, which, however, equally makes it into a positedness, or manifests itself as cause, again repels its effect from itself, and so on, to the spurious infinity." (565) ("Aber weil die Kausalität hier die sich selbst äußerliche Unendlichkeit ist, so kehrt sie auch ebensowohl in ihrer Wirkung nicht in sich zurück, wird sich darin äußerlich: ihre Wirkung wird wieder Gesetzsein an einem Substrate,—als einer andern Substanz, die aber ebenso es zum Gesetzsein macht oder sich als Ursache manifestiert, ihre Wirkung wider von sich abstößt und so fort in das Schlecht-Unendliche." [II:197])

²³⁸ "[V]erliert vielmehr die Kausalität darin." [II:197]

²³⁹ "[K]ommt die Wirkung an ein Substrat, welches Substanz, ursprünglich sich auf sich beziehendes Bestehen ist." [II:197]

²⁴⁰ There is, however, *transition*, in that Cause vanishes in Effect and vice versa. Later, Hegel will say that such concepts as force, cause and substance have actuality only in their effects; accordingly, "their activity is transition, against which they do not maintain themselves in freedom." (741) ("ist ihre Tüchtigkeit der Übergang, gegen den sie sich nicht in Freiheit erhalten"). In Teleology, End does not vanish. It *develops* its other. See chapter 24.

Active and Passive Substance

Passive Substance (Substrate) is immediate and for another, not for itself. It is the position of the thing that is indifferent if some outside will designates it Cause or Effect. For this reason, passive Substance is "confronted by the power of accidentality as itself *substantial activity*." (566)²⁴¹

Active Substance stands over against Passive Substance. Active Substance is Cause that has restored itself through the negation of itself. It is a reflected being—a *positing* activity. It is not Substrate but is originative of Causal relations.

Active Substance "acts on itself as on an *other*, on the *passive substance*." (567)²⁴² This act, Hegel says, is double. First, it sublates the other and returns to itself; it announces, "I am not passive." But, in this pose as immediate and indifferent to the passive, it reveals itself to be truly passive. Active Substance shows its dependence on otherness. Yet the meaning of the first aspect was that Effect is made into the other, toward which active Substance is passively indifferent.

Hegel compares the interaction of Active Substance and Passive Substance with violence. When Active Substance announces that it is not passive, it sublates "the self-subsistence of the passive substance." (567)²⁴³ This "first sublating of it also Appears in relation to the substance in such a manner that only *some determinations* in it are sublated and the identity of the passive substance with the active substance in the effect takes place externally in it." (567)²⁴⁴

To translate, Active Substance announces that it is not Passive Substance and thereby sublates it. This sublation requires that the passive other be determined. But, of the many determinations of Active Substance, only some are sublated. Active Substance says, "I am not *that* passive thing." In so saying, many passive things are unsublated, for the time being. For us, however, we know that Active Substance *is* Passive Substance, and negation of Passive Substance is self-negation. There is an identity of Passive and Active Substance, but this is only external knowledge at this point.

The sublation of Passive Substance is violence itself. "Violence is the *manifestation of power*, or power as *external*." (567)²⁴⁵ As an act of power, violence is visited "*only on an other presupposed by itself*." (567)²⁴⁶ Violence is the very proof of Active Substance. Passive Substance proves itself passive by submitting to the violence. "Therefore not only is it possible to do violence to that which suffers it, but also violence *must* be done to it." (567)²⁴⁷

"Passive substance therefore only receives its due through the action on it of another power." (568)²⁴⁸ But this violence has its positive side. In it, Passive Substance loses its immediacy. It becomes a positedness, in which it shares an identity with Active Substance. This identity proves that violence is always self-violence. The externality of this violent power is an illusion. This is passivity's scant revenge.

When Active Substance shows its identity with Passive Substance, "passive substance is converted into cause." (568)²⁴⁹ This conversion Hegel calls Reaction:

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

²⁴¹ "[D]ie Macht der Akzidentalität als selbst substantielle Tätigkeit gegenüber steht." [II:199]

²⁴² "[S]o wirkt sie auf sich als auf ein Anderes, auf die passive Substanz." [II:199]

²⁴³ "[D]er Selbständigkeit der passiven Substanz." [II:199]

²⁴⁴ "[J]enes erste Aufheben derselben erscheint in Beziehung hierauf zugleich auch so, daß nur einige Bestimmungen an ihr aufgehoben werden und die Identität ihrer mit der ersten in der Wirkung äußerlich an ihr geschieht." [II:200]

²⁴⁵ "Die Gewalt ist die Erscheinung der Macht oder die Macht als Äußerliches." [II:200]

²⁴⁶ "[N]ur ein von ihr selbst vorausgesetztes Anderes." [II:200]

²⁴⁷ "Demjenigen daher, dem Gewalt geschieht, ist es nicht nur möglich, Gewalt anzutun, sondern sie muß ihm auch angetan werden." [II:200]

²⁴⁸ "Der passiven Substanz wird daher durch die Einwirkung einer andern Gewalt nur ihr Recht angetan." [II:200]

²⁴⁹ "[D]ie passive Substanz nun selbst in Ursache verkehrt ist." [II:201] See Stephen Houlgate, *Why Hegel's Concept is not the Essence of Things*, 2 CARDOZO J.L. POLICY & ETHICS (2004) ("This is the decisive move that takes us forward to the concept: for it introduces the strict *identity* of the positing and posited moments").

Figure 51(b)
Action and Reaction
(Conditioned Causality)

Hegel discovers two outcomes from the promotion of Passive Substance into Reaction (an advanced form of Cause). First, Passive Substance was supposed to be an immediacy, but its in-itself is now revealed to be a positedness. That is to say, Cause always acts on an *other*, and this other is covertly in charge of the operation. Immediate passivity is now the real Cause.

The second outcome stems from the fact that the Passive other on which reaction works is itself Active. The Active therefore becomes the Passive. We have the typical dilemma of Dialectical Reason. Neither of the extremes can identify what they are on their own. "Since the two [extremes], then, are both passive and active, any distinction between them has already been sublated." (569)²⁵⁰

Hegel compares this development with the earlier step of Cause and Effect in Figure 49(b). There, Effect also turned into Cause of some new Effect. "But it did not react *against that cause*, but posited its effect again in *another* substance, giving rise to the progress to the infinity of effects." (569)²⁵¹ In Action and Reaction (also called Conditioned Causality), "the cause is *self-related* in the effect." (569)²⁵² Unlike Cause and Effect, Active Substance more clearly works on its own self and "is thereby just as much a *becoming* as a positing and *sublating of the other*." (569)²⁵³ When Active Substance acts (*i.e.*, causes something) it "receives its effect back into itself as reaction, thus reAppears as cause." (569)²⁵⁴ Instead of generating the infinite regress, action "is *bent round* and becomes an action that returns into itself, an infinite *reciprocal action*." (569)²⁵⁵ Hence:

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 51(c)
Reciprocal Action
(Absolute Substance)

C. Reciprocity

Well, I'd like to know where you got the notion.²⁵⁶

In finite Cause and Effect, two Substances were actively related to each other, but they were indifferent to the external attribution of Cause and Effect. The relation was merely mechanical. "*Mechanism* consists in this *externality* of causality, where the *reflection* of the cause *into itself* in its effect is at the same time a repelling *being*." (569)²⁵⁷ In Reciprocity, however, mechanism is sublated. Reciprocity represents "the *vanishing* of that original *persistence* of the *immediate* substantiality" of

²⁵⁰ "Indem beide hiemit sowohl passiv als aktiv sind, so hat sich bereits jeder Unterschied derselben aufgehoben." [II:202]

²⁵¹ "[S]ie wirkt hiemit dagegen, daß eine Wirkung in ihr gesetzt wurde. Aber sie wirkte nicht zurück gegen jene Ursache, sondern setzte ihr Wirkung wieder in eine andere Substanz, wodurch der Progreß von Wirkungen ins Unendliche zum Vorschein kam." [II:201]

²⁵² "[B]ezieht die Ursache in der Wirkung sich auf sich selbst." [II:202]

²⁵³ "[E]bensosehr Werden als Setzen und Aufheben des Andern ist." [II:202]

²⁵⁴ "[I]hre Wirkung als Gegenwirkung in sich zurück erhält, tritt damit wieder als Ursache auf." [II:202]

²⁵⁵ "[A]uslaufende Wirken umgebogen und zu einem in sich zurückkehrenden, einem unendlichen Wechselwirken wird." [II:202] It is not clear whether Charles Taylor sees the point that Cause acts only upon itself and is therefore also Effect—a Reciprocal Action. He thinks Hegel "throws in interaction" in order to give the Appearance that chapter 18 coheres with Kant's analogies of experience. TAYLOR, *supra* note 3, at 288. In fact, Reciprocity is exactly the right note for Hegel to sound here. It emphasizes that the Notion always acts only on itself. Taylor also has Hegel confessing "interaction" "to be a rather inexact term . . ." *Id.*, citing LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 54, § 156 Addition. But Hegel does no such thing. He simply announces that Reciprocal Action is not a satisfactory stopping place for the Logic—not that Reciprocity is "thrown in."

²⁵⁶ The Hughes Corporation, *Rock the Boat* (1974).

²⁵⁷ "Der Mechanismus besteht in dieser Äußerlichkeit der Kausalität, daß die Reflexion der Ursache in ihrer Wirkung in sich zugleich ein abstoßendes Sein ist." [II:202]

[1] and [3]. (569)²⁵⁸ It stands for originativeness and self-mediation.

By no means is Reciprocal Action the end of the Logic. Reciprocal Action still distinguishes within itself two extremes, which are themselves free, and it distinguishes itself as the middle term distinct from the two sides.²⁵⁹ The identity of being and Appearance is still a merely "inner necessity." (571)²⁶⁰ This inner necessity must be made express.

The Understanding takes Reciprocity to denote passivity and aggressivity externally conjoined as the In-Itself of Substance.²⁶¹

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 52(a) In-Itself of Substance

This conjunction of the two Substances is merely the passivity of Substance showing through. Already this passivity has been shown to be the result of Substance's own activity. Passivity is the negation of Cause by Cause itself, which thus converts itself into passive Effect. Dialectical Reason therefore points out that the extremes are not passive but active. "[I]t is no longer *substrates* but substances that stand in relation to each other." (569-70)²⁶² Hegel calls this the "being-for-self" of Substance. (578)²⁶³

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 52(b) Being-for-Self of Substance

The active movement in Figure 52(b) has sublated the "still remaining *presupposed immediacy*" of the extremes. (570)²⁶⁴ Active Substance is now Cause; "it *acts*, that is, it now *posits*, whereas previously it only *presupposed*." (578)²⁶⁵ But, precisely because the extremes move, they are still conditioned—by "the passivity of *being acted upon*." (570)²⁶⁶ Since this passivity is Cause's own being, Cause itself is passive. Cause acts upon itself and is therefore both conditioned and conditioning.

In acting on itself, active Cause aggressively asserts, "I am not passive." It therefore negates itself as passive and simultaneously converts itself into passive Effect. Cause *has* an Effect but also *is* the Effect. When this is realized, Causality has "returned to *its absolute Notion*" and "has attained to

²⁵⁸ "[D]as Verschwinden jenes ursprünglichen Beharrens der unmittelbaren Substantialität." [II:202]

²⁵⁹ Michael Inwood describes the fault of Reciprocal Action in the following analogy:

The items . . . are conceived of as each having a nature which is independent of its relationship to the other. The nature of each item explains why it responds in the way that it does to the successive states of the other item. Each of two boxers, for example, makes movements—evasive, defensive, offensive and retaliatory—which are in part caused by the movements of the other. But equally each of the boxers is an entity with certain characteristics independent of his interaction with the other, characteristics which in part explain his responses to the other's movements. The course of the boxing-match is not therefore fully explained in terms of reciprocity.

INWOOD, *supra* note 67, at 339-40.

²⁶⁰ "[I]nnre Notwendigkeit." [II:204]

²⁶¹ "An-sich-seins." [II:215]

²⁶² "Fürs erste sind es keine Substrate mehr, welche miteinander in Beziehung stehen, sondern Substanzen." [II:203]

²⁶³ "Fürsichsein." [II:215]

²⁶⁴ "[N]och übrige Vorausgesetzte Unmittelbarkeit." [II:203]

²⁶⁵ "[S]ie wirkt, d.h. sie ist nun das Setzen, wie sie vorher das Vorraussetzen war." [II:215] See FACKENHEIM, *supra* note 110, at 103 (Hegel's substance is "not a Substance which *is* independently of what it *does* . . .").

²⁶⁶ "[N]och die Einwirkung." [II:203]

the *Notion* itself." (570)²⁶⁷

[All illustrations can be found
in an Appendix to this Article]

Figure 52(c) The Notion

The Notion is in the business of acting upon itself and causing the manifestation of its own inner self.²⁶⁸ "[T]hat which is posited by the cause is the cause itself which, in acting, is identical with itself; it is this that puts itself in the place of the passive substance." (579)²⁶⁹ But equally, Cause translates itself into Effect. "Each side . . . becomes the *opposite* of itself, so that the other, and therefore also each, remains *identical with itself*." (579)²⁷⁰ Substance is "self-identical only in its opposite and this constitutes the absolute identity of the substances posited as a duality." (579)²⁷¹

In this act of self-causation, where Cause produces Effect and Effect produces Cause, "necessity is raised to *freedom*." (570)²⁷² This freedom has arisen from its self-negation—the negation of passivity. Freedom is therefore properly active and positive, but it arises from the self-destruction of negative freedom, which can be identified with passivity—a passivity that is productive and originative of the active, free subject.²⁷³ When passivity passes away—when "the category of reciprocity eliminates itself

²⁶⁷ "[Z]um Begriffe selbst gekommen." [II:203] The notional form has been with us for some time, Hegel suggests. At first, Notion was Real Necessity, as shown in Figure 46(c). Real Necessity stood for the totality of all conditions—for Actuality. In Real Necessity, each extreme—and the middle term—was itself, its other, and the union of the two. Accordingly, Real Necessity was "absolute *identity* with itself." (570) ("absolute Identität mit sich" [II:203]) Its extremes, however, were equally "substances, *free actualities*, over against one another." (570) ("Substanzen, freie Wirklichkeiten, gegeneinander, sind" [II:203]) Necessity was inner identity, and Causality was "the manifestation of this, in which its illusory show of *substantial otherness* has sublated itself." (570) ("die Manifestation derselben, worin ihr Schein des substantiellen Andersseins sich aufgehoben" [II:203])

²⁶⁸ According to Charles Taylor:

So obviously we are dealing with Concept in a very different sense than in Kantian philosophy, or, indeed, common sense. For the latter, the concept is a tool of our knowing, a way we have of grasping reality. Our use of it is, as it were, without prejudice to the nature of reality itself. For Hegel, on the other hand, the Concept is an active principle underlying reality, making it what it is.

TAYLOR, *supra* note , at 298.

²⁶⁹ "[D]as aber von der Ursache Gesetzte ist die im Wirken mit sich identische Ursache selbst; es ist die im Wirken mit sich identische Ursache selbst; es ist diese, welche sich an die Stelle der passiven Substanz setzt." [II:215]

²⁷⁰ "Nach beiden Seiten . . . wird jede das Gegenteil ihrer selbst; dies gegenteilig aber wird jede, [so] daß die andere, also auch jede, identisch mit sich selbst bleibt." [II:216]

²⁷¹ "[N]ur in ihrem Gegenteil identisch mit sich selbst, und dies macht die absolute Identität der als zwei gesetzten Substanzen aus." [II:216]

²⁷² "[D]ie Notwendigkeit zur Freiheit erhoben ist." [II:203]

²⁷³ Relevant here is Nancy's remark: "One is therefore tempted to conclude hastily that Hegel's thought is a 'panlogicism,' or the system of an inhuman mechanics of the absolute. But this is to forget that necessity must itself have a necessity, a sufficient reason: which, since its beginnings, is what philosophy has signified with *logos*. And this necessity of necessity is freedom." JEAN-LUC NANCY, *HEGEL: THE RESTLESSNESS OF THE NEGATIVE* 67 (Jason Smith & Steven Miller eds. 1997).

Positive freedom is one of Hegel's great contributions to political theory. In the *Lesser Logic*, he comments:

[W]hat a mistake it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive. Necessity indeed, *qua* necessity, is far from being freedom: yet freedom presupposes necessity, and contains it as an unsubstantial element in itself. A good man is aware that the tenor of his conduct is essentially obligatory and necessary. But this consciousness is so far from making any abatement from his freedom, that without it real and reasonable freedom could not be distinguished from arbitrary choice—a freedom which has no reality and is merely potential. A criminal, when punished, may look upon his punishment as a restriction of his freedom. Really the punishment is not foreign constraint to which he is subjected, but the manifestation of his own act: and if he recognizes this, he comports himself as a free man. In short, man is most independent when he knows himself to be determined by the absolute idea throughout.

LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 54, § 158 Addition. In other words, the truly free man is one with the law. The criminal who robs is the slave of impulse. The truer self of the criminal demands his own punishment as the reinstatement of the law that his crime has erased. See GEORG W.F. HEGEL, *ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT* § 100 Addition (Allen W. Wood trans. 1993) ("In so far as the

as a process"²⁷⁴—true freedom comes into being. Becoming other is now revealed to be an illusion: "the transition into an other is a reflection into itself; the *negation*, which is the ground of cause, is its *positive union* with itself." (570)²⁷⁵

In the Notion, "necessity and causality have vanished." (570)²⁷⁶ These contained both immediate identity as connection and absolute substantiality of the different sides. When Necessity and Causality are before us, the sides are absolutely contingent and contradictory. Necessity simply *is*. It is "the unity of being with itself that has itself for *ground*." (570)²⁷⁷ But simply because it has a ground, Necessity is not mere Being. It is likewise an Appearance, which implies that it is a relation. Necessity in relation is Causality, the "*posited* transition of originative being, of *cause*, into illusory being or mere *positedness*." (570)²⁷⁸ Action at this stage is reciprocal, so it is equally true that the positedness—the relation of Appearance to essence—is likewise immediate originativeness.

In the Notion, the substantiality of the sides is lost. The Notion, "is the unity of the *two substances* standing in that relation; but in this unity they are now free, for they no longer possess their identity as something blind, that is to say, as something merely *inner*." (581)²⁷⁹ The extremes unified in the Notion are now "moments of reflection, whereby each is no less immediately united with its other or its positedness and each contains its positedness *within itself*, and consequently in its other is posited as simply and solely identical with itself." (581-82)²⁸⁰

In the Notion, a truer necessity unveils itself. This version of necessity does not become freedom by *vanishing*. It becomes freedom because its inner identity is *manifested*. Manifestation is the identical movement of the different sides within themselves. Each of the sides moves in the same manifesting way. As Hegel puts it in the *Lesser Logic*:

For thinking means that, in the other, one meets with one's self. It means a liberation, which is not the flight of abstraction, but consists in that which is actual having itself not as something else, but as its own being and creation, in the other actuality with which it is bound up by the force of necessity. As existing in an individual form, this liberation is called I: as developed to its totality, it is free Spirit; as feeling, it is Love, and as enjoyment, it is Blessedness.²⁸¹

If Necessity (*i.e.*, manifestation of the inner self) becomes freedom, so does Contingency, "for the sides of necessity, which have the shape of independent, free actualities not reflecting themselves in one another, are now *posited as an identity*." (571)²⁸² These totalities are identical—they "are posited as only one and the same reflection." (571)²⁸³ In other words, if Contingency stands for the indifference of the extremes for one another, this very indifference to the other is what freedom is, and the manifestation of this freedom is precisely what the Notion is. It is *necessary* that the subject is a contingency. Hence, "freedom is the truth of necessity." (580)²⁸⁴

punishment which this entails is seen as embodying *the criminal's own right*, the criminal is *honoured* as a rational being").

²⁷⁴ HARTNACK, *supra* note 189, at 88.

²⁷⁵ "[D]ie Negation, welche Grund der Ursache ist, ist ihr positives Zusammengehen mit sich selbst." [II:203]

²⁷⁶ "Notwendigkeit und Kausalität sind also darin verschunden." [II:203]

²⁷⁷ "[D]ie Einheit des Seins mit sich selbst, das sich zum Grunde hat." [II:204]

²⁷⁸ "[D]ies gesetzte Übergehen des ursprünglichen Seins, der Ursache, in Schein oder bloßes Gesetztsein." [II:204]

²⁷⁹ "Dieser, die aus der Wechselwirkung resultierende Totalität, ist die Einheit der beiden Substanzen der Wechselwirkung, so daß sie aber nunmehr der Freiheit angehören, indem sie nicht mehr ihre Identität als ein Blindes, das heißt Innerliches." [II:218]

²⁸⁰ "Reflexionsmomente zu sein, wodurch jede mit ihrem Andern oder ihrem Gesetztsein ebenso unmittelbar zusammengegangen [ist] und jede ihr Gesetztsein in sich selbst enthält, somit in ihrem Andern schlechthin nur als identisch mit sich gesetzt ist." [II:218]

²⁸¹ LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 54, § 159.

²⁸² "[D]ie Seiten der Notwendigkeit, welche die Gestalt für sich freier, nicht ineinander scheinender Wirklichkeiten haben, nunmehr gesetzt sind als Identität." [II:204]

²⁸³ "[G]esetzt sind nur als eine und dieselbe Reflexion." [II:204]

²⁸⁴ "[D]ie Freiheit die Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit ist." [II:216] Charles Taylor comes close to proclaiming this transition to Notion a failure. He writes:

[W]e seem to have once more a case where Hegel is sure of an ascending transition because he is already sure of it; where he gives us what are only hints and traces of the higher reality which the lower is meant to be an emanation from, and takes these for a proof. The necessity to move to interaction or to the systemic perspective, can indeed be seen as a trace of the Concept; but it does not establish it. This conviction reposes rather elsewhere.

The Universal, Individual and Particular. Hegel concludes his theory of Essence by naming Reciprocal Action as Absolute Substance. Absolute Substance is one totality that is nevertheless distinguishable into the Universal, Individual and Particular.²⁸⁵ In this trinity—"the necessary categorial resources for determining self-determination"²⁸⁶—Absolute Substance "distinguishes itself from itself." (571)²⁸⁷ But it no longer *repels* itself from itself, nor does it "fall asunder into indifferent, self-external substances." (571)²⁸⁸ Rather, it differentiates itself within a totality—not into alien parts.²⁸⁹

The Universal is "negativity in general." (603)²⁹⁰ In its more developed form as the "I", the Universal stands for the abstraction of self-consciousness from all context. But, in negating all relations, it contains all relations—all positedness—even while it is self-identical.

The Individual is the negation of the negative Universal—"the negation or determinateness which is self-related." (582)²⁹¹ It is pure abstraction reified into a thing, which is likewise the whole. The Individual is "*absolutely determined*, opposing itself to all that is other and excluding it." (583)²⁹²

Universal and Individual are the same totality. The union of Universal and Individual, Hegel says, is Particularity. "These three totalities are, therefore, one and the same reflection." (571)²⁹³ Each of the totalities devolves into the other two, but the difference between them, though real, is nevertheless "*a perfectly transparent difference.*" (571)²⁹⁴ The three totalities before us are a single identity, a "determinate simplicity" and a "simple determinateness." (571)²⁹⁵ "This is the *Notion*," Hegel writes, "the realm of *subjectivity* or of *freedom.*" (571)²⁹⁶ The Objective Logic has drawn itself to a close.

Conclusion

Across Essence, "the specification of the whole . . . is presented over and over again as two correlated aspects reflected into each other."²⁹⁷ Throughout these pairings, the Being in the extremes of our syllogism moved more and more clearly toward the center. Increasingly, the center displaced the extremes, even as the center revealed itself to be entirely dependent on the extremes. This movement can be viewed as the final obliteration of nature in favor of subjectivity. "The collapse of the distinction between determiner and determined has led to the threshold of self-determination where what determines and what is determined are indistinguishable."²⁹⁸

We now move on to the Subjective Logic. There Notion must reestablish its own reality where

The transition from interaction to causation out of totality is already there and is grounded on the whole earlier argument of the *Logic*, on the very conception of Essence as totality whose parts follow one on another of necessity.

TAYLOR, *supra* note 3, at 294. In fact, if the Notion is that which manifests itself, the transition is pristine. Cause, taken as such, sublates itself, thereby showing that it acts only upon itself, never upon another thing.

Nor is it correct that Hegel moves from totality to interaction to causation. Rather, the move is precisely the opposite. Cause shows itself to be interaction between self and other, which is the totality known as Notion.

²⁸⁵ Here Hegel names them out of order, compared to their development in chapter 19. There, the order will be Universal, Particular and Individual. But since, as we shall learn, each part reflects itself, its other, and the unity of self and other, this misordering presumably may be excused. "These three totalities are . . . one and the same reflection." (571) ("Diese ihre einfache Identität sind . . . Eine und dieselbe Reflexion." [II:205])

²⁸⁶ WINFIELD, *supra* note 88, at 47.

²⁸⁷ "[S]ich von sich unterscheidend." [II:204]

²⁸⁸ "[I]n gleichgültige, sich äußerliche Substanzen auseinander." [II:204]

²⁸⁹ According to John Hoffmeyer, "The language of freedom does what the language of necessity can not do. It adequately articulates identity as movement and movement as identity." HOFFMEYER, *supra* note 10, at 11.

²⁹⁰ "Negativität überhaupt." [II:243]

²⁹¹ "[D]ie Negation oder Bestimmtheit, welche sich auf sich bezieht." [II:219]

²⁹² "[A]bsolutes Bestimmsein, welches sich Anderem gegenüberstellt und es ausschließt." [II:220]

²⁹³ "Diese ihre einfache Identität sind daher Eine und dieselbe Reflexion." [II:205]

²⁹⁴ "[E]inen vollkommen durchsichtigen Unterschied." [II:205]

²⁹⁵ "[B]estimmte Einfachheit . . . einfache Bestimmtheit." [II:205]

²⁹⁶ "Dies ist der Begriff, das Reich der Subjektivität oder der Freiheit." [II:205]

²⁹⁷ ERROL E. HARRIS, AN INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGIC OF HEGEL 207 (1983).

²⁹⁸ Winfield, *Overcoming*, *supra* note 198, at 63.

it feels at home. What we shall witness in the Subjective Logic is a kind of replay of the entire Objective Logic, as subjectivity (or Notion) makes all the stages of being its own.




Figure 43(a)
Exposition of the Absolute




Figure 43(b)
Movement of Reflection




Figure 43(c)
Attribute




Figure 44(a)
Attribute as Unessential




Figure 44(b)
Act of Attribution




Figure 44(c)
Mode




Figure 45(a)
Formal Actuality




Figure 45(b)
Possibility




Figure 45(c)
Contingency




Figure 46(a)
Necessity




Figure 46(b)
Real Possibility




Figure 46(c)
Real Necessity
(Totality of Conditions)




Figure 47(a)
Absolute Actuality
(Absolute Necessity or Contingency)




Figure 47(b)
Free Actualities




Figure 47(c)
Substance




Figure 48(a)
Absolute Relation
(Substance and Accident)




Figure 48(b)
Substance v. Accident




Figure 48(c)
Power (Substantiality)




Figure 49(a)
Formal Causality




Figure 49(b)
Cause and Effect




Figure 49(c)
Original Substance




Figure 50(a)
Substance as Substrate




Figure 50(b)
Finite Substance




Figure 50(c)
Internalized Causality




Figure 51(a)
Active and Passive Substance




Figure 51(b)
Action and Reaction
(Conditioned Causality)




Figure 51(c)
Reciprocal Action
(Absolute Substance)




Figure 52(a)
In-Itself of Substance




Figure 52(b)
Being-for-Self of Substance




Figure 52(c)
The Notion




Figure 53(a)
Universal Notion




Figure 53(b)
Particular Notion




Figure 53(c)
Individual Notion




Figure 54(a)
Positive Judgment




Figure 54(b)
Positive Judgment Reversed




Figure 54(c)
Negative Judgment